

9 JUNE 2011
Final report

Donor Strategies for Addressing the Transition Gap and Linking Humanitarian and Development Assistance

A Contribution to the International Debate

Julia Steets with contributions from Domenica Preysing and Gilla Shapiro

Imprint

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Global Public Policy Institute or the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Reinhardtstr. 15

10117 Berlin

Phone: +49(0) 30 275 959 75-0

Fax: +49(0) 30 690 88 200

gppi@gppi.net • www.gppi.net

Funder: German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

Author: Julia Steets

Editor: Global Public Policy Institute

Published: Berlin, 9 June 2011

Table of contents

Executive summary.....	3
1 Background and purpose of the study.....	6
2 The state of the debate	8
2.1 Defining forms of assistance	8
2.2 Defining concepts	11
2.3 German concepts in the context of the international debate.....	14
3 The nature of the funding gap for transition and strategies for addressing it	16
3.1 Defining recovery activities in greater detail.....	16
3.2 Evidence for the transition gap.....	19
3.2.1 No evidence for a temporal funding gap.....	19
3.2.2 Some evidence of a recovery funding gap.....	24
3.2.3 Strong evidence of a fragile states funding gap.....	25
3.3 Main donor strategies to fill the financial gap.....	27
3.3.1 Creating specialized funds or budget lines.....	27
3.3.2 Pooling funds or increasing their flexibility	30
3.3.3 Designating a specific share of humanitarian or development funds for recovery.....	32
3.4 The current use of DETA funds.....	33
4 Strengthening links between relief, recovery and development: Obstacles, options and conditions.....	35
4.1 Why missing links are a problem and what linking entails.....	35
4.2 Typical obstacles for donors trying to link different forms of assistance.....	36
4.2.1 Conceptual problems	37
4.2.2 Institutional divisions	37
4.2.3 Problems in re-orienting humanitarian and development departments	38
4.2.4 Problems relating to implementing partners.....	39
4.3 Current donor strategies.....	40
4.3.1 Decentralization	40
4.3.2 Institutional integration	43
4.3.3 Whole-of-government approaches.....	43
4.3.4 Strengthening linkage capacities of implementing partners ..	45
4.3.5 Other pragmatic steps	46
4.4 Conditions for linking relief, recovery and development	47
4.5 German linkage policies and practices.....	48
4.5.1 Main criticisms	48
4.5.2 Emerging good practice.....	52
5 Conclusion.....	55
Annex A: List of interviewees	57
Bibliography.....	60

Acronyms

ALNAP.....	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BMZ.....	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung / German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CERF.....	Central Emergency Response Fund
CWGER.....	Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery
DEA.....	Development-Oriented Emergency Aid German: Entwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe (EON)
DED.....	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
DETA.....	Development-Oriented Emergency and Transitional Aid German: Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe (ENÜH)
DFID.....	Department for International Development (UK)
DG ECHO.....	European Commission Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DRR.....	Disaster Risk Reduction
ERF.....	Emergency Response Fund
FAO.....	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
GIZ.....	Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit
GTZ.....	Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit
IDP.....	Internally Displaced Person
INCAF.....	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IP.....	Implementing Partner
KfW.....	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LRRD.....	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
NGO.....	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA.....	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC.....	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OTI.....	Office of Transition Initiatives
SDC.....	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SIDA.....	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UNDP.....	United Nations Development Programme
USAID.....	United States Agency for International Development
VENRO.....	Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen
WFP.....	World Food Programme

Executive summary

Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation pursue different aims and follow different principles. Their separation – while important to protect the independence of humanitarian action – has negative side effects. This paper seeks to contribute to the international debate by clarifying concepts, analyzing these effects and exploring donor strategies for addressing them.

The state of the debate

The paper first defines the subject area – the main forms of aid, as well as the different concepts used to describe and encourage links between them. **Relief** aims at saving lives and mitigating suffering, targets populations affected by emergencies, is based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality and most often provides assistance directly or works through civil society. **Recovery** constitutes the grey area that aims at recreating pre- or non-emergency situations, targets populations affected by emergencies, applies development principles as far as the humanitarian principles allow and has a preference for working through local communities and local government. **Development**, in turn, aims at improving the social and economic situation, targets societies as a whole, follows the principles of ownership, alignment, results and mutual accountability and preferably works through national and local governments.

Several concepts have been developed to analyze the disconnect between these forms of assistance. They include “developmental relief” or “development-relief”, “linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)” and “early recovery”. While the concepts vary in their emphasis, they highlight three aspects of linking: (1) applying development principles early on in emergency settings to ensure the ground for development is prepared; (2) ensuring a smooth transition as well as continuity and coordination between interventions on the ground; and (3) using development cooperation to support prevention and disaster risk reduction.

The funding gap

An important effect of the disconnect between the different forms of assistance is a funding gap for the transition between them. This “transition” can mean different things: a certain time-window during the response, specific types of response activities, namely recovery, or specific types of crisis situations, namely fragile states. Available evidence does not support the classic argument that a temporal funding gap occurs between a “humanitarian phase” and a “development phase” of the response. Instead, there is some evidence that a systematic funding gap for recovery activities exists and clear evidence that fragile states do not receive support commensurate with their needs.

Donors have developed several strategies for filling funding gaps, though it is not always entirely clear which of the gaps they seek to address. The main strategies are: 1. Creating specialized funds or budget lines such as Germany's Development-Oriented Emergency and Transitional Aid. 2. Pooling funding lines or increasing their flexibility such as the Dutch Stability Fund. 3. Designating a specific share of humanitarian and/or development funding for recovery or transition as is the case for example in Switzerland.

While providing targeted resources for gap areas is important and welcome, it does not address – and some strategies may even exacerbate – the underlying problem of the disconnect and its other negative effects.

Addressing the disconnect

The disconnect between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation does not only lead to a funding gap for the transition between them, but has other negative side effects as well. It exacerbates the short-term orientation of humanitarian assistance. It creates operational problems on the ground as synergies between interventions are not used and project implementation can be discontinuous. And it means that development actors often do not focus sufficiently on disaster risk reduction and preparedness.

When trying to address the disconnect, donors encounter typical obstacles. First, there are conceptual problems. It remains unclear to many what the different forms of assistance are and what the various linkage concepts entail. Second, many donors have institutional divisions between their humanitarian and development branches. These divisions are most pronounced when different ministries are responsible, but they also exist when different departments within the same ministry deal with humanitarian and development (and sometimes transition or recovery) issues. Third, effective linking means changing the ways both humanitarian and development actors operate. This is a difficult task that requires changing mindsets and incentive structures. Finally, donors are challenged by their implementing partners who often lack the expertise and capacity to operate across different forms of aid and do not coordinate their activities sufficiently with other actors.

Donors use different strategies to strengthen the links between different forms of aid. Decentralization is a general reform concept that entails benefits in this regard. By making allocation decisions at the country level, donors can tailor their support better to the situation on the ground and meet priority needs, including recovery and transition needs. Especially if the same individual or country office is responsible for administering both humanitarian and development assistance, they can create pragmatic linkages between the different funding lines and different implementing partners. Decentralization, however, entails a fundamental institutional reform, requires significant donor capacities on the ground and therefore usually requires focusing on a limited number of priority countries and relying on multilateral support mechanisms for the remainder.

An alternative is to strengthen intra-governmental coordination. Possible steps in that direction range all the way from small, pragmatic steps measures to improve information exchange and joint planning to formal inter-ministerial committees, whole-of-government approaches or institutional integration. While efforts to enhance internal coordination are indispensable, they often encounter institutional barriers and therefore often only have limited effects.

Complementing these strategies are measures to enable and incentivize implementing partners to adopt more holistic approaches and strengthen the links between different forms of assistance. This can include for example relying on the same partner organizations for humanitarian and development projects, requesting them to outline their linking strategies in funding applications and supporting them in identifying opportunities for follow-up funding.

Strengthening the links between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation is essential for making international assistance more effective and more efficient. Donors have various options for doing so and need to take strategic decisions. They can either opt for addressing one of the effects of the disconnect – the funding gap for transition – through specialized funding instruments. This promises quick and visible results, but exacerbates the underlying problem. Alternatively, they can opt for the more arduous route of reducing the disconnect through either decentralization, intra-governmental coordination, incentives for partner organizations or a combination of these measures.

1 Background and purpose of the study

The international system of humanitarian assistance was created in response to the savagery of European wars and out of concern for the victims of war. The institutionalization of development cooperation after the Second World War, by contrast, was driven by political interests such as allegiances during the cold war or post-colonial responsibilities. As a result of these different historical backgrounds, the two assistance systems have largely developed separately. Humanitarian assistance aims to save lives and alleviate human suffering and is guided by the principles of humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality.¹ Development cooperation, by comparison, seeks to achieve sustainable improvements in living conditions and is often aligned with the strategic and political interests of donor governments.

Reflecting this divide, most donors have developed separate mechanisms and institutions for providing and administering the two types of assistance. Over the last few decades, however, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation have increasingly come to be applied in the same countries and contexts. Under these circumstances, the strict dividing line between the two types of assistance has created serious negative side effects. Gaps in funding for transition have appeared. In addition, there is a disconnect between humanitarian and development interventions. This manifests itself in the excessive short-term orientation of humanitarian assistance, a lack of coordination and resulting discontinuity in project implementation, as well as insufficient consideration for conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction among development actors.

International aid actors have reacted in different ways to these challenges. The German government, for example, created a new budget line for “Development-Oriented Emergency and Transitional Aid” (DETA) in 2005 by merging existing budget lines for food, emergency aid and food security. The declared goal of the new funding instrument is to ensure a smooth transition between humanitarian and development assistance. Other donors have also created a variety of new funding instruments, made their existing instruments more flexible, earmarked resources for recovery, decentralized their aid operations and integrated or strengthened the coordination between their aid instruments.

With so many options for reform, most of which are relatively recent innovations, there are ample opportunities for mutual learning. This paper seeks to contribute to

1 Today, most donors, including the German government, formally subscribe to these principles. Cf. EU, 2008; AA, 2008; Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, 2003; UN, 1991. Cf. also Schweizer, 2004 and Barnett, 2003.

the international debate about and to support donors in their efforts to address the transition gap and the disconnect between humanitarian and development assistance.

It does so first by providing a summary of the current state of the international debate. As part of this, it argues that it is important to distinguish between the two parts of the problem as outlined above, first the transition gap and second the disconnect between humanitarian and development assistance. The remainder of the study therefore treats the two issues separately and analyzes the nature of the problem, as well as possible solutions to it separately.

2 The state of the debate

When describing and addressing the problems of the transition gap and the disconnect between humanitarian and development assistance, donors and practitioners are moving in a conceptual maze. Where, for example, do relief, recovery and development start and where do they end? And what exactly do the different concepts for connecting these forms of assistance, from linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) to early recovery and developmental relief, entail?

Since many, if not most of these concepts lack clear, universally accepted definitions, establishing clear definitions of the terms and clarifying their usage in the international debate is a first necessary step in order to sharpen a funding instrument's focus and strengthen links between different forms of assistance.

2.1 Defining forms of assistance

While many terms are used to describe different types of assistance, the main categories are relief or humanitarian relief, recovery or transition² and development. Within this canon, disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention play a special role: While they pursue their own distinct goals, namely reducing vulnerabilities to hazards and conflict risks, they otherwise fit largely into the definition of development. Yet, historically development actors have not invested sufficiently in disaster risk reduction and prevention, be it for a lack of awareness and incentives or a lack of emergency-related expertise.³ Disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention have therefore turned into cross-cutting issues that are addressed through relief, as well as recovery and development instruments.

Many donors distinguish their different types of assistance according to timing. They often finance relief for up to six months, engage in recovery activities for six months up to three years and engage in development cooperation for at least three, and more often between five and ten years.⁴ This temporal formulation is

2 There are a large number of terms especially to describe the area between relief and development. Next to the general terms of 'recovery', 'rehabilitation', 'transition', the 'grey zone', the more specific concepts of 'reconstruction', 'stabilization' and 'peacebuilding' are used. This study will use the term "recovery" throughout because it is most commonly used and because its meaning is broader and more intuitive than for example "rehabilitation". Some also use the term 'early recovery' in a similar way. This usage, however, is confusing since the term was mainly developed to denote "the application of development principles to humanitarian situations" CWGER, 2008, p. 3, i.e. the transformation of relief activities to make them more conducive to and compatible with development activities, rather than a specific phase or type of activity.

3 The 2010-2011 Mid-Term Review of the Hyogo Framework of Action, for example, emphasizes that disaster risk reduction is primarily a developmental issues, but is currently largely addressed through relief and humanitarian mechanisms and instruments International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2011. For an overview of disaster risk reduction activities of European Union member states and the European Commission, see Few, 2010.

4 Germany is not the only donor that funds assistance activities within such time frameworks (Cf. e.g. BMZ,

popular because it provides a simple and easily understandable way of delimiting the different forms of assistance and the corresponding institutional responsibilities. It is, however, also deeply problematic and runs counter to most donors' official acceptance of the 'contiguuum' model.⁵

Many current emergencies do not move in a predictable and linear fashion from a relief through a recovery to a development phase. Instead, conflicts often re-emerge and natural disasters complicate pre-existing humanitarian and development situations. Moreover, many aid actors recognize that an effective and comprehensive response requires the use of relief, recovery and development instruments simultaneously, rather than sequentially following each other. Distinguishing assistance forms by the life-span of interventions, therefore, makes little sense in the face of protracted or complex emergencies.⁶ The European Commission, for example, has acknowledged this difficulty. The "linking relief, rehabilitation and development" (LRRD) component of its food security thematic programme is not tied to any specific timeframe, but to the level of fragility of a situation and the availability of other aid instruments.⁷ Similarly, eligibility for project funding with the World Bank Peace- and State-building Fund (PSF) is linked to fragility.⁸

Instead of using timeframes, several other characteristics can be used to distinguish between the main assistance forms:⁹

2007, AA, 2008). For example, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO) covers a maximum period of six months EU, 1996 (as amended in 2003, 2009), its Instrument for Stability finances recovery activities in crisis contexts for up to 18 months with the possibility of a 6 months extension EU, 2006 (as amended in 2009) and the European Development Fund has a five year horizon EU, 2007. Multilateral organisations also differentiate assistance by funding time horizon. For example, the World Food Programme's (WFP) financial regulations authorize emergency operations (EMOP) for up to 24 months and development-related country programmes for periods of no more than five years. The WFP's "protracted relief and recovery" operations, by contrast have no clear time-limit, but are usually supported for an "extended period" WFP, July 2009.

- 5 The 'contiguuum' model was developed to replace the 'continuum' model in the linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) debate. It highlights that the different forms of assistance are usually applied simultaneously, rather than in phases.
- 6 The problematic nature of time-based definitions of assistance forms is confirmed by recent attempts of the World Food Programme (WFP) to redefine its program categories. WFP originally constricted its emergency operations to 24 months from the onset of a crisis. It is now considering including relief activities in protracted crises into emergency operations and as a result would drop the time restrictions on this program category.
- 7 European Commission, 2010, pp. 24ff
- 8 World Bank, N/S
- 9 This follows for example the logic of the European Commission, which, in a formal communication on 'linking relief, rehabilitation and development' described the differences between relief and development activities as follows: "The former addresses the immediate needs of individuals affected by crises and is provided mainly through non-governmental and international organisations. The latter aims to support autonomous development policies and strategies and is provided mainly under co-operation programmes agreed with the partner country. [...] The corresponding instruments and working methods differ in their time perspective, the implementing partners, the role of national authorities and the content of interventions." EU, 2001. Other attempts to define different forms of assistance using one or several of these criteria include: WFP, July 2009, Welthungerhilfe, 2007, Welthungerhilfe, N/S, VENRO, 2006, CWGER, 2008 and OECD, 2010.

- **Distinction by goals.** Perhaps the most intuitive and obvious way to distinguish between forms of assistance is by the goals they seek to achieve. Relief aims at saving lives and mitigating human suffering in emergencies. Recovery generally aims at re-creating the conditions before the most recent emergency. Development aims to improve the economic and social conditions of a society outside times of crisis.
- **Distinction by target group.** The goals mentioned above also imply that the different forms of assistance typically target different groups. Thus, relief as well as recovery target individuals affected by crises or disasters (including those indirectly affected such as host communities or reintegrated ex-combatants), while development tends to focus on a society as a whole.
- **Distinction by principles.** A third way of distinguishing between the different types of assistance is by their basic principles. Thus, relief is usually governed by the humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality.¹⁰ This means that humanitarian actors provide assistance purely on the basis of need and do not side with any party in a conflict. Development, by contrast, is guided by the principles of sustainability, national ownership, alignment of donor activities with country strategies and systems, as well as a focus on results and mutual accountability of donors and partners.¹¹ Recovery activities take place in emergency or post-emergency situations where the humanitarian principles apply and seek to apply development principles in so far as they are compatible with humanitarian principles.
- **Distinction by cooperation partners.** Due to these differences in principles, relief, recovery and development actors on the ground tend to work with different kinds of partners. Relief activities are typically implemented directly by international agencies or NGOs or through local contractors and civil society organizations. Recovery actors often work with local communities and seek to build local capacity so that working with and through local authorities and the national government become possible. Development strongly involves the central and local government.

Table 1 provides an overview of the different forms of assistance and their defining characteristics:

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. EU, 2008, Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, 2003, UN, 1991

¹¹ Cf. e.g. OECD, 2005/2008

Table 1: Definitions of main forms of assistance

	Relief	Recovery	Development
Goals	save lives, mitigate suffering	re-create pre- or non-emergency situation	improve social and economic situation
Target groups	populations affected by emergencies	populations affected by emergencies	societies as a whole
Principles	humanity (needs-based) independence impartiality neutrality	applies development principles with restrictions / as far as humanitarian principles allow	ownership alignment results mutual accountability
Preferred cooperation partners	none or civil society	local communities and local government	central and local government

Using this set of criteria we can abstractly distinguish between the various forms of assistance. In real-life, though, the differences are not always so clear-cut. The boundaries between different forms of assistance blur especially in cases of chronic underdevelopment and protracted crises. For most operational actors on the ground, the definitions of the different forms of assistance are mainly relevant because donors and implementing organizations use them to define organizational mandates and funding criteria. Many practitioners and an increasing number of donors would prefer to organize their work according to the evolving needs of affected populations rather than abstractly defined assistance forms.

2.2 Defining concepts

The distinctions between the different forms of assistance have led to problems in providing adequate levels of funding for all priority needs, as well as in ensuring coordination and coherence between the different approaches. Donors, implementers and researchers have therefore long been discussing ways of filling funding gaps for transition and addressing the disconnect between humanitarian and development cooperation.¹² In the course of these debates, a range of concepts have been created to understand and address these problems.

¹² Debate about linking relief, rehabilitation and development is decades old. According to Smilie, the debate revolved mainly around the idea of a continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development between the 1960s and 80s. In the 90s, discourse shifted to the concept of a 'contiguum', the idea that different population groups have different types of needs at the same time. Cf. Smilie, 1998 and Koddenbrock, 2009, p. 119.

First, there is a debate surrounding **funding gaps for transition** in the current aid architecture. It has been suggested that such funding gaps exist during a certain time-window during the response, for specific types of response activities and for specific types of crisis situations. Confusingly, all three are sometimes referred to as “transition”. To highlight the difference between these three meanings, this study will use the term “temporal funding gap” to refer to gaps in funding during a specific time-window between relief and development, “recovery funding gap” to refer to gaps in funding for recovery activities and “fragile states funding gap” to designate gaps in funding for fragile states and protracted crises.

Second, several concepts have been developed to describe the disconnect between different forms of assistance. In essence, most of the main concepts used in this context are similar and entail three distinct, but interrelated aspects for addressing the disconnect: (1) applying development principles early on in emergency settings to ensure the ground for development is prepared; (2) ensuring a smooth transition as well as continuity and coordination between assistance forms on the ground and (3) using development cooperation to support prevention and disaster risk reduction. The various concepts, however, sometimes differ in their emphasis of these aspects and often fail to distinguish clearly between them. The most common concepts include the following:

- **Developmental relief.** The term developmental relief or developmental humanitarian assistance has been broadly defined as “synonymous [...] with the aspiration or effect to link disaster relief with (long term) development aid”.¹³
- **Development-relief.** In the US context, the most commonly used term is that of development-relief. While the above-quoted developmental relief suggests a focus on the development-orientation of relief activities, development-relief explicitly refers to both sides of the coin. It has been defined by the US Administration as “an approach that encourages the programmatic linkages of the emergency and development objectives, and relies on flexibility. [...] Development-Relief programming encompasses development-conscious emergency programs that ‘enhance community and household resilience to shocks’ [...], and emergency-conscious development programs that incorporate resource contingencies and promote effective and coordinated interventions related to disaster prevention and recovery.”¹⁴
- **Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD).** The equivalent to development-relief in the European context is LRRD. The concept was first officially adopted by the European Commission, which has various formal communications on the issue and an LRRD working group, and is now widely used by donors, humanitarian actors and the research community in Europe. The concept seeks to promote a more holistic approach to assistance

13 Lindahl, 1996, p. 2

14 USAID, 2009, pp. 11-12

to developing countries. Specifically, it demands that relief actions take better account of development requirements and objectives, that specific recovery and post-crisis assistance is provided that facilitates the transition from relief to development and that development actions take better account of the risk of emergencies.¹⁵

- **Early recovery.** A more recent addition to the conceptual phrasebook is early recovery. The term was introduced during the United Nations-led humanitarian reform process of 2005. It designates a recovery component that is explicitly part of the humanitarian system and that is implemented early on in the relief effort.
- As part of this process, early recovery was institutionalized as the early recovery cluster, led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).¹⁶ Despite attempts by UNDP and the cluster working group on early recovery to define the concept, the term early recovery and its use by different actors remain ambiguous and include both strengthening the development-orientation of relief activities and a new type or even phase of intervention. Formally, UNDP describes early recovery as “the application of development principles to humanitarian situations” and emphasizes that early recovery is not a separate stage in a continuum between relief and recovery.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the term is often used in this way.¹⁸
- **Connectedness.** The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) has coined the term connectedness and has added it as a standard criterion for evaluating humanitarian assistance to the regular set of criteria proposed by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC). It offers the following formal definition: “Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.”¹⁹

15 EU, 1996

16 Cf. Bailey, 2009

17 UNDP, 2008, p. 7

18 WFP in its recent attempts to redefine program categories, for example, shows ‘early recovery’ as the phase between ‘emergency’ and ‘extended recovery’ (which in turn is followed by ‘development’). Cf. WFP, July 2009.

19 ALNAP, 2006, p. 27

2.3 German concepts in the context of the international debate

Most concepts used by the German government broadly correspond to the terms used in the international debate – with one exception: that of development-oriented emergency and transitional aid (DETA).

The German government uses **disaster risk reduction** or **disaster risk management** (Katastrophenvorsorge) as the main term to refer to disaster risk reduction activities. **Economic cooperation and development** (*wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung*) is the formal term for development activities. It includes technical cooperation and financial cooperation.

Humanitarian assistance (*humanitäre Not- und Soforthilfe*) is used as a term for all forms of assistance in acute emergency situations, be they caused by natural disasters, epidemics, war or internal conflicts. Most forms of humanitarian assistance are administered by the Federal Foreign Office, though the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development is responsible for most food assistance, as well as some other emergency assistance as part of its so-called development-oriented emergency and transitional aid (*entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe*).

The concept of **development-oriented emergency and transitional aid** (DETA) has no clear correspondence in the international debate. The term was originally created to designate a special funding line and the responsible unit in the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.²⁰ Subsequently, the term was also adopted by agencies drawing on this funding line. They largely use it to denote a certain type of assistance and are now also implementing DETA projects that are funded through other financial instruments than the DETA budget line.

As a concept, DETA – as many of the other concepts discussed above – remains vague and ill-understood. The main official documents²¹ describe the background, rationale and activity types implemented as DETA, but fail to provide a clear definition. The term itself suggests that it combines two distinct elements: Development-oriented emergency aid implies a focus on changing the way relief activities are implemented so that they include development principles as far as possible and prepare the ground for development activities early on. This part of the concept is thus roughly equivalent to early recovery as defined above. Transitional aid, by contrast, suggests that DETA funds are specifically targeted at a special phase or type of activity, namely recovery. When used in this sense, DETA designates an assistance form, rather than a linkage concept.

20 A concept note of the ministry provides the main explanation of the concept and intended use. Cf. BMZ, 2005.

21 The main official documents relating to DETA include a concept note and funding guidelines of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ, 2005 and BMZ, 2007), a practical guidance note of the implementing agency German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (GTZ, 2007) and a government report on humanitarian aid (Bundestag, 2010).

This conceptual ambiguity is reflected in the way DETA funds are used in practice. Historically, DETA was created by merging different budget lines. Accordingly, DETA funds can now be used to finance relief projects, for example food distributions or emergency shelter, as well as recovery activities such as the return and reintegration of refugees or IDPs or the reconstruction of public buildings or even initial development projects such as the improvement of the living conditions of poor populations. The concept note for the use of DETA funds contain references to the development-orientation of sponsored projects and emphasize that institution-building and participatory approaches should be used as much as possible.

3 The nature of the funding gap for transition and strategies for addressing it

3.1 Defining recovery activities in greater detail

In chapter 2 above, we defined what are commonly referred to as “recovery”, “rehabilitation” or “transition” activities as those that:²²

- Aim at recreating the status quo ante
- Focus on populations affected by emergencies
- Seek to apply development principles, but acknowledge restrictions
- Often work through local communities and seek to strengthen national and local capacity when government structures are not yet functional

In practice it is not always easy or possible to draw a clear dividing line between recovery activities on the one hand and relief and development on the other. One reason for this is that real-life situations often stubbornly refuse to fall into neat categories. Another reason is that individual projects often contain several different elements and whether they count as relief, recovery or development depends upon the situation. A cash-for-work program, for example, would count as relief when it is used to construct a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees, as recovery when it serves to rehabilitate basic general infrastructure and as development when it provides employment opportunities to poor individuals not affected by a crisis.

While creating a rigid matrix of recovery activities is therefore problematic, an overview can help donors with a special funding line for recovery or transition

22 This is similar to the criteria used by the global Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) to define ‘early recovery’ activities. As discussed above, the concept of ‘early recovery’ was not designed and should not be used to designate a specific type of activities, but describes the application of development principles to humanitarian situations or else ways to start recovery early on in an emergency. In practice, however, actors have defined a set of typical ‘early recovery’ activities which is largely congruent with ‘recovery’ or ‘transition’ activities as they are defined in this study. The CWGER defined those projects as ‘early recovery’ that: are non-life-saving; aim to resuscitate and strengthen national and local capacity for assessing, coordinating and planning for early recovery and longer-term recovery; aim to resuscitate and strengthen national and local capacity to lead the implementation of early recovery programs based on needs and strategies defined at the country level; and help reduce dependency on relief assistance and help communities restore their livelihoods, aid the delivery of humanitarian assistance and pave the way for longer-term fully fledged recovery CWGER, 2008, p. 8.

to clarify its purpose and disbursement criteria. Table 2 provides some typical examples of general, as well as sector-specific recovery activities that meet the criteria defined above.²³ It neither claims to be universally applicable, nor to be exhaustive.

Table 2: Typical recovery activities	
General recovery activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs • Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants • Peace building, reconciliation, truth and justice commissions • Support for livelihoods and income-generating activities for emergency-affected population, vocational training • Rehabilitation of markets • Restoration of basic financial services • Cross-cutting issues incorporated into recovery activities (children, gender, environment, minorities, disabilities etc.) • Disaster preparedness and conflict prevention • Support to host communities • Implementation of Post-Disaster Needs Assessment or Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
Governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishment of an interim administration • Capacity building in relevant communities and government departments, based on a mapping of available services and resources • Restoration of basic public services • Trans-regional collaboration for recovery • Rebuilding national armies, police forces, law enforcement • Access to justice for emergency-related cases
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mine detection and clearance, stockpile destruction, disarmament • Prevention programs aimed at vulnerable populations (e.g. prevention of rape, theft amelioration, adequate child care)

23 The following process was used for generating the table: The study team first analyzed a range of concrete project documents, including for example project sheets contained in consolidated appeals and the projects identified as 'early recovery' by the CWGER, as well as the list contained in Bailey, 2010, to collect examples of projects fitting the abstract definition provided at the beginning of this chapter. Subsequently, these examples were cross-checked and completed through interviews with sector and early recovery specialists.

Table 2: Typical recovery activities

Food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restoration of agricultural production, e.g. through the provision of quality seeds, fertilizers, agricultural machinery and tools or through land rehabilitation • Improved market access for affected populations • Protection of animals and farm life, e.g. through vaccination and health services and protection from predators • Agricultural infrastructure rehabilitation, e.g. irrigation, water resources policy • Increased resilience for vulnerable farming, e.g. drought resistant plants or training on livestock management, pest management or soil fertility • Information and training on food security and nutrition, e.g. healthy diets and hygienic preparation of food • Improved urban and peri-urban food production, e.g. home and school gardens • Support for national food security early warning and preparedness systems
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rebuilding and rehabilitation of school facilities and materials • Training for teachers to fill vacant positions • Improved access to education for emergency-affected population
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction of subsidized, but pay-for health services • Rehabilitation of clinics and health infrastructure • Capacity assessment of health authorities and health workers in disaster-affected areas, where necessary followed by training, capacity building and incentives for staff redeployment to affected areas • Reinforcing the responsibilities for service delivery by the national health authorities • Risk assessments to strengthen preparedness • Health education, public awareness, public information and community involvement • Psychosocial and community support for affected populations, psychosocial care for those in need of acute services • Reintroduction and support for insurance systems • Standardization of health information systems between partners and public sector

Table 2: Typical recovery activities

Logistics, infrastructure and telecommunication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restoration of basic infrastructure, e.g. roads, bridges • Restoration of basic public transport systems • Rehabilitation of telecommunication infrastructure and coverage • Restoration of communication capacity of local authorities and government and rehabilitation of administrative buildings • Rubble and debris removal
Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structural damage assessments • Community based affirmation of property rights • Transitional shelter and rental accommodation • Shelter repair and rehabilitation • Support for relocation to areas of origin
Water, sanitation and hygiene	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rehabilitation of water and sanitation infrastructure • Rehabilitation of market for water and sanitation services (gradual reintroduction of pay-for services) • Waste management in temporary and transitional shelters

3.2 Evidence for the transition gap

“The transition funding gap expresses the fact, often experienced in post crisis situations, that transition needs receive far less support than required.”²⁴

As discussed in section 2.2, there are various accounts of what the funding gap for transition consists of: It can designate gaps in funding during the time window between humanitarian and development assistance (“temporal funding gap”), for recovery activities (“recovery funding gap”) or for fragile states and protracted crises (“fragile states funding gap”). This section reviews the arguments behind these different gaps and analyzes available empirical evidence relating to them.


3.2.1 No evidence for a temporal funding gap

The classic argument regarding the transition gap is depicted in illustration 1. It assumes that the main problem is one of the timing of funding. As a crisis subsides, humanitarian funding phases out, but development funding is slow to resume. This creates a financial gap during the transition phase.²⁵

24 UNDG-ECHA, December 2009, p. 2

25 The CWGER, for example, rehearses this argument in its study on the financial gap in ‘early recovery’:

Illustration 1: The classic argument for the “transition gap” does not hold



Source: GPPI

This argument is, however, problematic in theory and is not supported by evidence.

The argument assumes that conflicts and disasters usually develop in a linear fashion and progress from an emergency to a transition to a development phase. Yet, as argued in section 2.1 above, many emergencies today are recurrent, protracted or complex and do not follow such a clear path of progression.

More importantly, whether or not progress happens, actual funding flows do not follow the patterns depicted in illustration 1, at least not when analyzing available data on a country-by-country basis.²⁶ Thus, development funding does not usually decrease when crises become acute. Nor does it resume only after humanitarian funding has declined. Rather, randomly selected country examples (charts 1 to 8) show that humanitarian and development funding often follow the same broad trends, i.e. development cooperation increases at roughly the same time as humanitarian assistance rises. In other cases, development funding is erratic, following political considerations rather than the evolution of a crisis situation.²⁷



“funding gaps occur in the period during which humanitarian funding is phased out and before developmental funds can be accessed and mobilized. Development funding mechanisms, which can take up to 18 months to disburse funds, are either much too slow to bridge this gap or donors are unwilling to commit significant development funds due to continued instability in the country” CWGER, 2008, p. 3.

26 In theory, this leaves open the possibility that temporal funding gaps occur for individual regions within a country. Since assistance data are mainly recorded on a country and not on a regional level, it is impossible to assess whether or not this is the case on the basis of existing data.

27 A study by the OECD, for example, provides a detailed analysis of humanitarian and development funding

Similarly, econometric analyses of aid flows to post-conflict countries show that overall assistance levels are particularly high in the first post-conflict years. They tend to decline thereafter and return to levels that are more comparable to assistance levels for fragile countries that are not affected by conflict.²⁸




Charts 1 - 8: Humanitarian and development assistance flows over time²⁹




trends over time in Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste. It shows that in Sudan and Timor-Leste, development cooperation increases sharply just before humanitarian assistance. In the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo development flows are erratic and unrelated to, but consistently higher than humanitarian contributions. In Burundi and Afghanistan, trends in humanitarian and development funding roughly match, but development contributions continue increasing once humanitarian funding phases out. Cf. OECD, 2010.

28 Cf. Collier, 2004, Collier, 2003 and Kang, 2004.

29 Data source for all charts: OECD DAC 2a disbursement, available at <http://stats.oecd.org>




Sierra Leone



Source: DAC 2a disbursements, available at: <http://stats.oecd.org>

Yemen



Source: DAC 2a disbursements, available at: <http://stats.oecd.org>

3.2.2 Some evidence of a recovery funding gap

An alternative account of the funding gap for transition argues that, irrespective of timing, specific types of activities, namely recovery activities (that confusingly are often called “transition” activities), are more difficult to finance than others. The reluctance of public institutions to engage in the grey area of recovery stems from two factors. First, recovery projects may meet neither the criteria for humanitarian funding lines, nor those for development funds. Second, public funds are subject to the scrutiny of parliamentary budget committees and audit institutions. In most cases, these control institutions are intent on avoiding duplications and overlapping mandates. Where responsibilities for recovery activities are not clearly allocated and there is a lack of coordination between departments, public institutions may therefore be cautious in their engagement for fear of being criticized.

Conclusive evidence for a recovery funding gap is difficult to come by, especially since humanitarian and development funding data are tracked and recorded separately and in different formats. Yet, several studies have produced some evidence that a funding gap for specific recovery activities exists:

- The global **Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER)** conducted a study on financing levels for early recovery projects. While early recovery properly understood does not designate a specific type of activities,³⁰ CWGER employs a set of criteria to identify early recovery projects and these criteria meet most of the characteristics of recovery projects as defined here.³¹ On this basis, the study identifies a broad range of early recovery projects in different types of humanitarian appeals and analyzes whether or not these projects receive funding. The study concludes that early recovery projects consistently achieve much lower financial coverage than humanitarian activities overall.

More specifically, it finds that the analyzed Flash Appeals cover 53% of overall humanitarian needs, but only 17% of early recovery needs. Within the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), overall coverage is 78%, while the coverage of early recovery projects is only 44%. Similarly, local pooled funds like the Common Humanitarian Funds in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have an overall coverage of 84% and 57% respectively, while early recovery projects only receive 43% and 36% respectively.³²

30 Early recovery properly understood signifies the application of development principles to humanitarian activities. Following this definition, trying to distinguish between early recovery and other, ‘normal’ humanitarian activities is not appropriate. Instead, the relevant question should be how strongly humanitarian activities embody early recovery and to what degree they manage to incorporate development principles.

31 CWGER used the following criteria for identifying early recovery projects: non-life saving, aim to resuscitate and strengthen national and local capacities for recovery, help reduce dependence on relief and restore livelihoods, aid the delivery of humanitarian assistance and pave the way for longer-term recovery. Cf. CWGER, 2008.

32 Cf. CWGER, 2008.

Congruent with these findings, participants in a 2009 online survey conducted by CWGER most frequently pointed to funding issues as the main challenge for early recovery.³³ To put these findings into perspective, however, it is important to note that it is based exclusively on an analysis of humanitarian funding data and contains no information about the provision of development funds for recovery activities.

- The **Overseas Development Institute (ODI)** conducted a similar study on financing for early recovery in humanitarian appeals in 2010. The study starts from the assumption that there is “a clear sense among aid agencies and donors that such activities are both necessary and under-funded in humanitarian appeals.”³⁴ The study finds that levels of financing for early recovery projects vary strongly between regions and between sectors. Overall, it confirms that early recovery projects are seriously under-funded, with less than half of their requirements met on average, but also points out that several sectors such as protection, education, agriculture, health and water, sanitation and hygiene face similar levels of under-funding.
- Finally, the **NYU Center on International Cooperation** analyzed the ability of the international community to take early action to promote post-conflict recovery. The study builds on several country case studies and identifies a financing gap as one of the main current weaknesses of the international system with respect to early recovery activities in post-conflict settings. More specifically, the identified gap encompasses gaps in funding for standing capacity for strategic planning at country level and for political implementation, gaps in realistic, flexible and responsive funding and problems relating to the ability to spend development money early.³⁵

3.2.3 Strong evidence of a fragile states funding gap

The term “transition” is sometimes also used in the debate about fragile and conflict-affected states. In this context, the transition gap means inadequate funding for (in varying definitions) countries recovering from conflict or facing a situation of fragility or protracted crisis. Strong, evidence-based arguments have been put forward that a funding gap for these situations exists, at least in part due to donor fatigue:³⁶

- The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has an institutionalized mechanism for strengthening the focus of the organization and participating donors on conflict-affected and fragile states, the **International**

33 The survey was conducted among early recovery stakeholders in September 2009 and received over 200 responses. Financing was quoted by 16.4 per cent as a major challenge. The second most frequently mentioned challenge was coordination mechanisms with 14 per cent. Cf. CWGER, 2010.

34 Bailey, 2010, p. 5

35 Chandran, 2008, p. 8

36 Cf. VOICE, 2006

Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF). This network regularly tracks international contributions to fragile and conflict-affected states and in its recent report “Transition Financing: Building a Better Response” analyzes donor practices in this area.³⁷ The study found that donor contributions to fragile states have increased significantly over the last decade, reaching around 31% of total overseas development assistance in 2008 for 43 countries classified as fragile by the OECD. These resources, however, are highly concentrated with over 46% going to just five countries.³⁸

In per capita terms, assistance to fragile states remains lower than that to non-fragile states, even though needs are typically higher. Levin and Dollar estimate that for the period between 1992 and 2002, fragile states received 43% less aid per capita than expected given their poverty level.³⁹ Over the last decade, average per capita contributions to fragile states have increased significantly.⁴⁰ However, a gap in absolute terms remains and much of the growth has been driven by increases in assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza.⁴¹

The INCAF study on transition financing also addresses the question whether the right types of activities are financed within fragile states. It concludes that it is impossible to quantify assistance flows to transition activities because there is no commonly accepted definition of what constitutes transition activities and no consistent reporting between humanitarian and development sources. Nevertheless, it finds that “there is general agreement amongst international actors that money available does not flow in timely and effective ways to the highest priority transition needs.”⁴²

- The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) issues an annual report on the **State of Food Insecurity in the World**. In its latest report, the FAO focused on protracted crises, i.e. countries that are affected by recurrent disasters or conflict, long-term food crises, a breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to crises.⁴³ Analyzing assistance flows to these countries, it finds that, excluding Afghanistan and Iraq, the remaining 20 protracted crises receive 12% of global overseas development aid and slightly

37 OECD, 2010

38 They are Afghanistan (13.3%), Ethiopia (9.5%), Iraq (9.4%), West Bank and Gaza (7.3%) and Sudan (6.6%). Source: OECD, 2010.

39 Cf. Levin, 2005.

40 Cf. OECD, 2010, p. 37.

41 In 2008, for example, average per capita aid for fragile countries was \$36 in current prices. Afghanistan received \$159 per capita and the West Bank and Gaza received \$668 per capita. Cf. OECD, 2010, p. 54.

42 OECD, 2010, p. 16.

43 Using three formal criteria for operationalizing these characteristics, FAO classified 22 countries as protracted crises in its 2010 report. All of these 22 countries are also classified as fragile by the OECD INCAF. Cf. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 2010.

higher average per capita contributions than the group of least developed countries. Based on these data, the report argues that the level of assistance to countries in protracted crises remains low. Moreover, it focuses on contributions to different sectors and finds that sectors that are critical to food security, namely agriculture and education, remain seriously underfunded.

The FAO report also addresses the issue of recovery activities. It emphasizes that certain of these activities are particularly important in protracted crises. This includes interventions to promote livelihoods, support for local and national institutions, investments in agriculture and the rural economy and the restoration of basic social protection measures such as safety nets, insurance, health and education services.⁴⁴ However, the report is unable to provide quantitative evidence regarding the level of international support for these activities since the standard OECD-DAC codes do not allow for a more detailed analysis of interventions.

- Econometric reports emphasize that the funding gap is especially pronounced for fragile countries that have not experienced recent conflict. Boyce and Forman (2010), for example, argue that fragile countries receive only 65 per cent as much assistance per capita as non-fragile countries and only 41 per cent as much as post-conflict countries. Moreover, they point out that this disparity has been widening over time.⁴⁵

3.3 Main donor strategies to fill the financial gap

The available quantitative evidence thus suggests that there is no temporal funding gap, but probably a recovery funding gap and almost certainly a fragile states funding gap. Donors have developed several strategies for filling “the gap” – though it is sometimes not entirely clear which of the three gaps they seek to address and the same strategy may be used to respond to different real or imagined gaps. The three main strategies are: 1. creating specialized funds or budget lines; 2. pooling funding lines or increasing their flexibility; and 3. designating a specific share of humanitarian and/or development funding for recovery or transition.

3.3.1 Creating specialized funds or budget lines

One option for filling the funding gap is to create specialized financing instruments. Some of these are designed to provide financial support in the purported time-window between humanitarian and development assistance, thus reacting to an imagined gap. Others focus explicitly on recovery activities or fragile states and protracted crises. Yet others seek to achieve a combination of these goals:

44 Cf. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 2010, p. 2.

45 Boyce, 2010

- **The European Commission’s Instrument for Stability.** In 2006, the European Commission created a new funding instrument to fill the recovery funding gap in crisis or emerging crisis situations. It explicitly aims to finance recovery activities that are neither entitled to the Commission’s humanitarian funding nor to its regular development funds.⁴⁶

The Instrument for Stability works under accelerated and simplified procedures to ensure a timely response.⁴⁷ It can support projects for up to 18 months. It has a total budget of € 2.06 billion over seven years (2007-2013). Of that, 30 per cent is earmarked for initiatives responding to security threats, including for example the peace-building partnership.⁴⁸ The remaining two thirds can be used for recovery activities in both natural disaster and conflict settings. These include, for example, “support for measures necessary to start the rehabilitation and reconstruction of key infrastructure, housing, public buildings and economic assets, as well as essential productive capacity, and for the re-starting of economic activity” and the reintegration of refugees and IDPs.⁴⁹

- **Germany’s Development-Oriented Emergency and Transitional Aid (DETA).** The German transition fund covers emergency as well as transition and recovery and sometimes development activities. The fund is mainly used to support food assistance programs, the (re-)building of a basic physical and social infrastructure, return and reintegration programs for refugees and IDPs, as well as disaster risk reduction measures. DETA can fund projects lasting between six months and three years⁵⁰ and the majority of its resources go to fragile states and protracted crises. Its design thus combines response elements to all three gaps described above. In 2010, DETA funding amounted to € 130.34 million, of which € 40 million was spent on food assistance projects.⁵¹
- **Norway’s “Gap” budget line.** In 2004, Norway created a special instrument for recovery, the “Gap”. The fund can support a broad range of recovery activities of Norwegian NGOs and multilateral organizations, including reconstruction,

46 EU, 2006 (as amended in 2009), Art. 2 & 6

47 Under the Instrument for Stability, the Commission can adopt measures with immediate effect. It is supported in this process by a special committee. If the committee disagrees with the decision, it can inform the Council, which may overrule the decision within 30 days.

48 The Commission defines security threats as: “Threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health; (...) risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents (...) (and) pre- and post-crisis capacity building”. Cf. EU, 2006 (as amended in 2009), Art. 4.1-3. On the peace-building partnership, see for example Bayne, August 2009.

49 For a full listing of recovery activities sponsored by the IFS, refer to EU, 2006 (as amended in 2009). Art. 3

50 BMZ, 2005

51 BMZ, 2011. The overall level of support for food assistance during the same time was higher since in addition to the € 40 million accounted for here, many projects contain elements of food assistance that are not included in this number.

state- and peace-building and disaster risk reduction activities in fragile states, protracted crises and in the aftermath of natural disasters. It can also be used to build international capacity for crisis response.

In recent years the Norwegian government has changed course. Instead of strengthening its special instrument, it has made other budget lines more flexible. As a result, the gap fund is gradually becoming redundant, as evidenced by its decreasing budget.⁵² In 2011, gap funding has been reduced by 22 per cent compared to 2010, to € 49.1 million.

- **Denmark's Regions of Origin Initiative.** In 2003, the Danish government created an initiative specifically to provide recovery support for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by protracted conflict. With a yearly budget of around € 40 million, the initiative helps “ensure access to protection and durable solutions for refugees and IDPs as close to their home as possible”. This includes activities in support of voluntary repatriation, local integration in the country of asylum and resettlement to third countries.⁵³
- **USAID's Transition Initiatives.** Within USAID, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has authority over a special funding line for fragile states and protracted crises. This budget line was created in 1994 and contains between 40 and 60 million US\$ per year. OTI can also draw on other budget lines⁵⁴ and over the past years has allocated total resources ranging from a minimum of US\$ 80 million in 2007 and US\$ 267 million in 2005.⁵⁵ With the new strategic orientation of American aid outlined in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, OTI's significance is poised to increase.⁵⁶ OTI's programs support transition activities promoting peace and democracy as well as economic recovery in fragile countries and protracted crises.⁵⁷ While OTI can react more quickly than many other programs,⁵⁸ the office has been criticized for being overly restricted in the types of activities it can support, excluding for example disaster risk reduction. The newly created Complex Crisis Fund (CFF) and the Community Development Fund (CDF) within the

52 Interview with a Norwegian official.

53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, July 2008; budget figures provided by the Office of Humanitarian Action, Development and Civil Society within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

54 Including the Economic Support Fund, the Development Assistance and the International Disaster and Famine Assistance Accounts.

55 Lawson, 2009

56 Department of State, 2010, p. 137

57 Including for example grass-roots conflict resolution and state-building measures, the promotion of independent media, the reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as basic infrastructure revitalization. US, 2010

58 OTI has a special expedited contracting and disbursement mechanism and only has to notify the House and Senate Appropriations Committee five days prior to starting new programs. Programs typically last two to three years, but can also be extended far beyond this time horizon.

US Feed the Future Initiative may cover some of these funding gaps relating to transition situations.⁵⁹

The list indicates that specialized funds have become popular among donors in the early 2000s. It was at that time that the parliaments that appropriated the budgets were beginning to acknowledge the importance of the different gaps, including the recovery and fragile states gap. Creating specialized funds gave them the opportunity to provide clearly recognizable funding for the gaps they were targeting.

Yet, such funds typically create difficulties: First, such funds and especially recovery funds often foster disputes over mandates and responsibilities within donor agencies. It tends to be difficult in practice to clearly delimit relief from recovery from development activities. Second, they exacerbate the linkage challenge since it becomes not only necessary to ensure consistency and continuity between humanitarian and development projects, but also between them and dedicated recovery activities.

3.3.2 Pooling funds or increasing their flexibility

Another way to close the recovery and fragile states funding gaps is to adapt the requirements and guidelines of existing funding mechanisms to enable them to better address these needs. This can be achieved either by pooling different resources so that more flexible use is possible or by adapting the criteria of existing funding mechanisms. To ensure recovery activities can be supported quickly in sudden-onset emergencies, humanitarian instruments should be able to cover recovery activities in these cases. For slow-onset emergencies and protracted crises, where the speed of response is less of a concern, development instruments could also be expanded to cover recovery needs.

- **The Dutch Stability Fund.** The fund was created in 2004 to enable the Netherlands to react flexibly to situations of conflict and fragility. It pulls resources together from different ministries and budget lines, some of which are eligible as official development assistance (ODA) and some of which are not. The fund is managed by an inter-ministerial commission including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Economic Affairs, Justice, the Interior and Finance.⁶⁰ Resources have been used to support peace-building and state-building activities, as well as disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of former combatants. In 2008, the fund had a total budget of € 100 million, of which 70 per cent was eligible as ODA and 30 per cent was not. There is no formal limit to project size and duration, with an emphasis on budget flexibility.⁶¹

59 InterAction, 2010

60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Nov 2008, Klem, 2007

61 OECD, 2010, p. 96.

- **The Danish Stabilisation Fund** pools ODA and non-ODA funds for more flexible spending on peace and state-building measures in situations of fragility and conflict. For 2011, the fund has an overall budget of around € 20 million, of which less than half qualifies as ODA. To create better linking between security and development, the fund is managed by an inter-ministerial secretariat that includes among others representatives from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Defence and of Justice.⁶² Similarly, the UK's Conflict Pool, discussed in more detail below in section 4.3.3 combines ODA and non-ODA resources.
- **Canada's Global Peace and Security Fund** was created in 2005 to support response to international crises. It invests C\$ 178 million in 2010/11 in state-building and peace-building activities in fragile and protracted conflict contexts.⁶³
- **The European Commission's European Development Fund** is the Commission's main instrument for providing development assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.⁶⁴ It was revised in 2010 to provide more flexibility in programming and implementation and increase coverage of emergency and recovery needs. Thus, its B-envelopes that are earmarked for crisis and post-crisis situations can now also be employed for situations of fragility and explicitly include recovery activities as post-emergency assistance. The reforms also provide more flexibility for adapting programs in reaction to crisis situations, exogenous shocks and unforeseen needs by extending the grounds that justify ad hoc program reviews.⁶⁵ To date, however, these revised mechanisms have only rarely been used, possibly due to the political implications of classifying a partner country as fragile.⁶⁶
- **United Kingdom African humanitarian funding reserve.** In an attempt to enhance the flexibility of its funding instruments, the British government has for example extended the funding horizon of the African humanitarian funding reserve from 12 to a maximum of 24 months.⁶⁷

Most implementing agencies and actors on the ground favor more flexible funding to enable them to develop holistic solutions in fragile states and to adequately meet recovery needs.⁶⁸ The approach has two major advantages. Firstly, by offering

62 Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, September 2010, pp. 6-8; budget figures provided by the Office of Humanitarian Action, Development and Civil Society within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

63 "The Global Peace and Security Fund", <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpsf-fpsm.aspx>

64 The 10th EDF provides € 22.7 billion for development assistance between 2008 and 2013. Cf. EU, 2010.

65 Cf. EU, 2010, especially Art. 72 – 73 and Annex IV, Art. 3.4, 9.4 and 14.2.

66 Cf. OECD, 2010, pp. 49 f.

67 Government of the United Kingdom, 2010, OECD-DAC, 2006, p. 27; Interview

68 All implementing agencies interviewed for this study, including all recipients of DETA funds, supported

more flexibility, it enables a more needs-based approach and allows agencies to address priority needs regardless of their classification as relief, recovery or development. Secondly, it relaxes the divisions between different forms of aid, encourages a more holistic approach and facilitates linkages between humanitarian and development interventions.

Because of these advantages, an increasing number of donors are adopting more flexible approaches. Yet, they can be difficult to implement in countries in which parliaments demand detailed ex-ante control over resource allocation and therefore insist on highly detailed and clearly defined budget lines.

3.3.3 Designating a specific share of humanitarian or development funds for recovery

To maintain control over the allocation of resources while avoiding budgetary and institutional compartmentalization, some donors have defined ratios to determine what share of available resources should be used for different types of activities.

Thus, for example, the **Swiss** Parliament has earmarked 30 per cent of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation's (SDC) humanitarian assistance envelope for recovery and reconstruction, 10 per cent for preparedness and disaster risk reduction and 10 per cent for advocacy programs. Compliance with these proportions is monitored and spending is adjusted accordingly.

Similarly, the **European Council and Parliament** have pre-defined allocations from the Instrument for Stability. 70 per cent of this fund can be used flexibly for a wide range of recovery and development activities in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, as well as for prevention and preparedness under stable conditions. The remaining 30 per cent of the envelope is earmarked for more specific activities, including core recovery activities, preparedness and risk mitigation: 10 per cent of this 30 per cent is reserved for responding to "threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health", 15 per cent to "risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents" and 5 per cent to "pre- and post-crisis capacity building."⁶⁹

Earmarking of resources allows parliaments to extend their control and to ensure their preferences for certain forms of assistance over others are implemented. At the same time, however, earmarking restricts the flexibility of resources and thus reduces the ability of actors to react to evolving needs on the ground.

this position. A number of interview respondents further noted that, where such flexibility is lacking, they strategically use private donations to finance recovery activities. Cf. INCAF, 2010, § 8d.

69 EU, 2006 (as amended in 2009), Art. 1&4

3.4 The current use of DETA funds

As briefly mentioned above, DETA combines several elements in its definition and conception and can therefore not clearly be categorized as either a transition, or a recovery or a fragile states instrument.


Officially, DETA pursues two objectives. First, to provide effective and quick assistance to people in emergencies and second, to create the basis for sustainable development in the aftermath of an emergency. The objectives suggest that DETA was created as a mixed relief, recovery and development instrument. The current use of funds supports this interpretation. As illustrated in chart 9 below, between 2006 and 2010, roughly half of all DETA resources were used for relief projects, including a large number of food assistance, as well as other emergency relief activities such as emergency shelter, emergency assistance for children or support and protection for refugees. Around a third of all DETA resources during the same period were spent on recovery projects such as the return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, the stabilization of livelihoods of emergency-affected populations or the rehabilitation of infrastructure. A further eleven per cent of the DETA envelope was allocated to projects with an exclusive focus on disaster risk reduction, while many projects classified as “relief” or “recovery” also include some aspects of disaster risk reduction. In absolute terms, this means that the German government allocated between € 40 and € 57 million per year to recovery activities out of the DETA budget line. This corresponds to less than 1 per cent of German official development assistance⁷⁰ and around 25-30 per cent of reported German humanitarian assistance.⁷¹ In addition to this, other BMZ departments⁷² allocated up to € 64 million or 12.5 per cent of the DETA envelope to relief and recovery operations between 2006 and 2009.⁷³

70 According to OECD-DAC statistics, Germany spent a yearly average of over US\$ 12 billion in current prices on overseas development aid, which includes humanitarian and transition assistance. Cf. <http://stats.oecd.org>, last accessed January 14th, 2011.

71 According to the financial tracking service, where donors self-report contributions to humanitarian projects, Germany allocated a yearly average of around US\$ 300 million to humanitarian assistance. Cf. <http://fts.unocha.org>, last accessed January 14th, 2011.

72 Including BMZ regional units, as well as unit 115 (churches, political foundations and social infrastructure support) and 213 (organization of technical cooperation).

73 These contributions were coded as: 52010 (Food Aid/Food Security), 72010 (Material relief assistance and services), 72040 (Relief co-ordination; protection and support services), or 72050 (Short-term reconstruction work after emergency or conflict). Data source: BMZ.

Chart 9: The allocation of DETA funds across different forms of assistance

Source: Sources: Bundestag (2010): Bericht der Bundesregierung über die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland 2006-2009 und BMZ

While this is not made explicit in the guidelines, DETA also has a relatively strong focus on fragile states and protracted crises. Over half of all DETA resources were allocated to fragile states and protracted crises between 2006 and 2009, more than four times as much as to other countries.⁷⁴ By comparison, only around 35 per cent of Germany's overall official development assistance went to fragile states during the same time – a share that is very close to the average of all OECD-DAC countries.⁷⁵

In addition to being a partial instrument for recovery, as well as a partial instrument for fragile states and protracted crises, DETA funds can only be allocated for a specific timeframe, namely for between six months and three years. This suggests that DETA was designed to address a temporal funding gap between German humanitarian assistance (covering projects for up to six months) and development cooperation. In practice, however, the German government often does finance relief, recovery and development activities simultaneously. While implementing partners are thus critical of the strict time-limitations, arguing that recovery projects often only become effective after more than three years, they all certify that the fund plugs an important financial hole.

74 To classify countries as “fragile” or “protracted crises”, we follow the criteria and use the country lists provided by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) contained in: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 2010.

75 Data sources: OECD DAC Statistics, 2011 and Bundestag, 2010.

4 Strengthening links between relief, recovery and development: Obstacles, options and conditions

As discussed above, the differentiation and sometimes strict dividing line between humanitarian and development cooperation has not only led to funding gaps, but also to a disconnect between the different forms of assistance.

This chapter explores why missing links between different forms of assistance are problematic and what linking entails. It then describes which typical obstacles to linking exist, what strategies donors employ to strengthen links and under what conditions which forms of linkages are appropriate.⁷⁶

4.1 Why missing links are a problem and what linking entails

Insufficient links between different forms of assistance undermine aid effectiveness in several ways.

First, they can exacerbate the short-term orientation of humanitarian assistance. Without appropriate links, aid organizations can often not predict whether they will receive follow-up funding. Worse, many humanitarian organizations know their chances of receiving recovery and development funding are poor because humanitarian and development donors often work with different implementing partners. Both aspects reinforce the existing tendency among many humanitarians to focus on the short-term. Short-term horizons as well as the failure to define exit strategies help explain why relief activities often fail to prepare the ground for development and sometimes even undermine more sustainable solutions.⁷⁷ As a result, humanitarian assistance often does little to end emergencies and creates aid dependency.

Second, missing links create concrete operational problems on the ground. Both humanitarian and development actors are active in most current emergencies in the

76 The debate on linking relief, rehabilitation and development is decades old. According to Ian Smilie, the debate revolved mainly around the idea of a continuum from relief to rehabilitation and development between the 1960s and 1980s. In the 1990s, the discourse shifted to the concept of a 'contiguuum', i.e. the idea that different population groups can have different types of needs at the same time. Cf. Smilie, 1998, Koddenbrock, 2009, p. 119.

77 Thus, for example, badly planned food aid can destroy local markets and harm local agricultural production. Cf. e.g. Donovan, 2006. Similarly, state-building activities undertaken as part of development efforts may consolidate the power of a government and thereby exacerbate conflict. Cf. Collinson, 2010.

developing world. Yet, while they operate side-by-side, they often do not benefit from possible synergies between their work, thus rendering the aid effort less effective and less efficient. With humanitarian and development coordination systems that are usually not connected and in some cases with a geographical and sectoral division of labor between relief, recovery and development activities, there is often little mutual learning and coordination. As a result, aid interventions are often not holistic and therefore not effective. A further typical effect is discontinuous project implementation. When funds from one source run out, implementing agencies need to mobilize different resources. Without donor (internal) coordination, however, direct follow-up funding is difficult to obtain. Operational agencies therefore often have to temporarily suspend their work or shift it to a different location.

Finally, missing links between different forms of assistance also mean that development actors are often insufficiently aware of the emergency-related aspects of their work. Thus, development actors tend to invest too little in disaster risk reduction⁷⁸ despite the known effectiveness of these measures.⁷⁹ Instead of reducing the risks and impacts of emergencies, development activities sometimes even increase them. This can be the case for example when development programs strengthen the power position of the ruling elites and thereby exacerbate conflicts.

To address or avoid these problems, stronger links between the different forms of assistance are necessary. As introduced above in section 2.2, this entails (1) Applying development principles early on in emergency settings to ensure the ground for development is prepared, (2) ensuring a smooth transition, continuity and coordination between assistance forms on the ground and (3) using development cooperation to support disaster risk reduction.

4.2 Typical obstacles for donors trying to link different forms of assistance

Despite their efforts, many donors continue to face significant obstacles in linking their different forms of assistance more closely to each other. The exact nature of their challenges depends on their institutional set-up, funding practice and overall administrative framework. Typical challenges that are relevant to most donors include conceptual problems, institutional divisions, shortcomings within individual departments and problems relating to implementing partners:

78 The Hyogo Framework for Action Mid-Term Review emphasizes that “Handling what is primarily a developmental issue with largely relief and humanitarian mechanisms and instruments, while helpful at the beginning, needs to be reconsidered to ensure that disaster risk reduction plays the role that it must in enabling and safeguarding development gains.” International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2011, p. 11.

79 DRR offers a high return on investment: one dollar invested in disaster prevention can save seven dollars’ worth of disaster-related economic losses.” UNDP-Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, October 2010

4.2.1 Conceptual problems

Like all aid actors, donors begin to struggle at the conceptual level. First, it is often unclear what the different forms of assistance are. To date, there is no commonly accepted definition of “relief”, “recovery” and “development” and the distinction tends to blur in practice (see section 2.1).

Second, the various linkage concepts continue to cause confusion. On the one hand, this is because so many competing concepts with similar, but not identical, meanings are used.⁸⁰ On the other hand, it is because individual concepts are often misunderstood. This applies in particular to the two most common concepts used in Europe: linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and early recovery. In both cases, actors often mistake these linkage concepts for assistance forms and speak of LRRD and early recovery “projects”, “funding lines” or even intervention “phases”. In the case of LRRD, moreover, most actors understand the term only as referring to a strengthening of continuity and coordination between assistance forms and neglect the other two aspects outlined above, namely ensuring that relief activities become more development-oriented and that development programs do more to reduce the risk of disasters.

4.2.2 Institutional divisions

Another important hurdle for strengthening linkages is created by institutional divisions between the humanitarian and development branches of donors. These divisions are most pronounced where different ministries are responsible for each area, but they also exist when different departments within the same ministry deal with humanitarian and development (and sometimes transition / recovery) issues.

These divisions are created or reinforced by a number of factors. First and foremost, the two areas are governed by different principles and objectives. According to the humanitarian principles, humanitarian assistance should be independent of other political or economic objectives. Accordingly, humanitarian assistance often bypasses state structures while development cooperation is often provided by or with the state.⁸¹ It is also crucial for humanitarian instruments to be able to react quickly to unforeseen events such as sudden-onset disasters or unexpected outbreaks of violence. Many donors have therefore created separate institutional mechanisms for handling humanitarian assistance. These institutions – be they departments or independent ministries – then often find themselves competing over resources and mandates with development-oriented institutions. This tends to be particularly pronounced for the grey area of recovery, as well as the cross-cutting tasks of disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention. Moreover, most of these institutions face pressures from budget and oversight committees to create clear responsibilities and avoid overlaps. This tends to favor a clear division of

80 For the most common linkage concepts and their definitions, please see section 2.2.

81 Cf. Lindhal, 1996.

labor, for example along temporal, geographic or sectoral lines, which undermines links between the different areas.⁸²

For operational agencies trying to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development activities, these divisions can create important challenges. For one, humanitarian and development (and sometimes also recovery) branches of one and the same donor often have different administrative requirements in terms of application as well as reporting processes. This creates an increased administrative burden especially for smaller organizations. Moreover, the funding cycles of these institutions are often not in sync, so that implementing partners face “stop and go” support which undermines continuous project implementation.⁸³ A lack of donor-internal coordination, in addition, means that information about projects that would need follow-up funding or that could be complementary is often not passed on.

4.2.3 Problems in re-orienting humanitarian and development departments

Effective linking, however, is not just about enabling implementing partners to operate smoothly across different forms of assistance. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, it is also about changing the ways that both humanitarian and development actors operate. Since this requires changing mindsets and incentive structures, donors also face distinct challenges in this regard.

First, donor departments for humanitarian and development assistance typically draw on different communities for recruiting staff members. Officials in the humanitarian department(s) thus usually have a background in emergency relief, but often lack experience in and knowledge about development – and vice versa for the development departments. As a consequence, each side tends to focus on the principles and requirements of its own discipline, but finds it difficult to include the other perspective. Moreover, recovery often requires a general understanding of the context, whereas aid projects are often organized by sectors.⁸⁴

Second, incentive structures in most modern administrations do not encourage risk-taking.⁸⁵ Powerful audit commissions, for example, most often examine whether budgets were spent according to the relevant rules, but not how effective related interventions were. For officials, this means that it is much safer to stick to traditional approaches and insist on a strict division of labor, rather than experiment with new ideas and blur the boundaries between bureaucratic mandates.

82 Cf. Brusset, 2009.

83 Cf. European Commission, 2001.

84 Cf. Brusset, 2009.

85 Cf. INCAF, 2010, p. 5.

Finally, as hinted at in section 2.1, there is an additional incentive problem regarding disaster risk reduction: While the benefits of investments in disaster risk reduction have been amply demonstrated, they are rarely tangible or visible. A prevented disaster will never make headlines. Especially in an era in which policy-makers consider the visibility of development cooperation as crucial, it is therefore often difficult to mobilize sufficient development resources for conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction.

4.2.4 Problems relating to implementing partners

The work of the agencies implementing donor-funded projects on the ground determines in the end whether different forms of assistance are well linked or not. From their perspective, donors can be part of the problem. Their conceptual confusion, the institutional divisions and problems in reorienting their humanitarian and development departments hinder the operational agencies in implementing more holistic and better integrated programs. Yet, implementing partners also present problems to donors intent on strengthening linkages due to their lack of expertise and capacity, as well as insufficient operational coordination.

Many operational agencies are specialized in either humanitarian relief or development assistance. This makes it impossible even for the best-intentioned donors to support projects across different forms of assistance and arrange for seamless follow-up funding.⁸⁶ Switching from one implementing organization to another, however, necessarily implies efficiency losses. In addition, many specialized and especially smaller organizations only have a narrow expertise base. This lack of knowhow and knowledge often prevents humanitarian organizations from effectively adopting an early recovery approach and including development principles in their work from the very beginning in so far as they are compatible with the humanitarian principles. Likewise, many narrowly specialized development organizations lack the capacity to appropriately consider emergency-related factors in their work.⁸⁷

The potential negative effects of this lack of capacity and expertise are exacerbated by the fact that many aid organizations do not coordinate sufficiently in the field. Over recent years, the humanitarian arena has seen the introduction of new coordination mechanisms such as the cluster approach. While this has improved sector-based coordination among humanitarian organizations, it has so far failed to improve and may even have undermined coordination between humanitarian and development actors.⁸⁸

86 The European Commission, for example, reports that of 40 proposals to conduct development following the Mozambique floods, only two were from NGOs that had also been involved relief in the area. European Commission, 2001, p. 15.

87 Cf. Bailey, 2009.

88 Cf. Steets et al., 2010.

4.3 Current donor strategies

Donors have implemented a variety of measures, ranging from broad institutional reforms to small pragmatic steps, to strengthen links between their different forms of assistance. The following section discusses some of the main strategies adopted by donors, as well as other potential options for addressing the disconnect.

4.3.1 Decentralization

Some donors have shifted their capacities for analysis and authority for decision-making towards the country level, while headquarter units focus more on supporting country units and taking global allocation decisions. While this has not been proven empirically, decentralization of both humanitarian and development assistance can have positive effects on linkages as country representatives / teams can:

- Ensure that priority needs within the country, including transition/recovery needs, are funded.
- Facilitate smooth transitions between different funding lines so that continuous project implementation becomes possible, especially when different forms of assistance are administered by the same individual or office on the ground.
- Support coordination among implementing partners to ensure their responses are complementary and add up to a more holistic response to problems and/or that they build on each other in their work (for example when projects initiated by emergency organizations transition into more sustainable solutions implemented by organizations with a development orientation).
- Work with implementing partners, for example through feedback on their funding applications, to encourage a greater development-orientation of emergency relief programs, as well as greater consideration for conflict prevention and disaster risk reduction within development programs.

Decentralization can take many shapes. To reap the benefits described above, however, several issues need to be considered: First, country teams need to have substantial influence on funding decisions to ensure implementing partners take them seriously. Second, decentralization should not replicate institutional fragmentation at headquarters level. Ideally, one individual or country team should be responsible for all forms of assistance.⁸⁹ Finally, it is important to ensure that this individual or members of that team have a background in and understanding of both humanitarian and development approaches.

⁸⁹ Some benefits are also likely to arise when different institutions with autonomous decision-making processes are replicated on the ground, simply by virtue of the closer proximity and therefore enhanced opportunities for informal cooperation among staff members. Yet, the realization of these benefits would depend much on the personal dynamic among those staff members and would thus not be systematic.

Reforms to decentralize decision-making can be introduced step-by-step. In political practice, such gradual reforms are often easier to implement than sweeping institutional changes at headquarters level. Serious decentralization, however, requires substantial capacity on the ground. Most donors cannot maintain fully-fledged country offices in all countries at risk of emergency and thus have to concentrate on a few priority countries. To be able to support all acute emergencies and allocate their aid on the basis of need nonetheless, donors can either maintain a more limited capacity at headquarters level, operate through regional offices⁹⁰ or work through multilateral mechanisms for non-priority countries.

In practice, donors have implemented different forms and levels of decentralization. One of the most far-reaching models is that of the **UK**. DFID maintains 20 country offices. In most cases, these offices administer both development and humanitarian assistance for the country in question.⁹¹ This allows them to address relief, recovery as well as development needs and enables them to provide their local partners with strong incentives to coordinate within and across the different forms of assistance.

At headquarters, DFID maintains two departments responsible for humanitarian assistance: the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) and the Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit (ACHU). As long as emergencies remain predictable, long-running or small-scale, these departments support DFID's country offices by deploying specialists and by channeling additional resources to their respective countries. In the early stages of major rapid onset disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake or the 2010 Haiti earthquake, however, CHASE assumes the lead and becomes the primary point of contact for implementing partners. For non-priority countries without DFID representation, either DFID regional offices or the regional desks in London assume the role of the country offices.⁹²

The **European Commission** has chosen another interesting model. It maintains a much stricter division between development and humanitarian assistance. Its humanitarian arm, the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (**DG ECHO**), works in a de-concentrated manner. DG ECHO maintains 44 country and 6 regional offices.⁹³ Country offices play an important role in planning and implementing operations, though they do not have the authority to take funding decisions. Thus, they monitor the humanitarian situation and

90 The OECD-DAC comments on how this strategy is used for development cooperation: "DAC members decentralise primarily to country-level but some of them also report having regional offices. Decentralising to the regional level can be useful for donors who may want to cover a larger number of countries out of one office, or provide nearby support and expertise to smaller offices. It may be a particularly appropriate choice for small donors." OECD, 2009, p. 5

91 Cf. e.g. Spaak, 2009, p. 18.

92 Cf. Interview, OECD, 2010 and DFID, October 2007.

93 Cf. DG ECHO, 2011 and Spaak, 2009, p. 13.

coordinate actions among DG ECHO's implementing partners, as well as between DG ECHO and other humanitarian and development donors. In Sudan, for example, NGO proposals are shared between DG ECHO, DG Devco and other donors to support the transition of particular projects to longer term funding.⁹⁴ In countries without direct DG ECHO presence, regional support offices can send experts to conduct rapid humanitarian needs assessment in the case of sudden onset emergency.

Since 2001, the Australian aid agency **AusAID** has also decentralized many of its program management functions to its country offices. Senior AusAID officers in the field have significant financial and programming authority. Should changing circumstances demand this, they are authorized to adjust AusAID strategies, approaches and allocations. Notably, this includes the ability to move funding between humanitarian, recovery and development activities. Assessments of AusAID's activities find that this model enables a flexible, context-driven approach to transition financing and programming.⁹⁵

Similarly, **Norway** has devolved program management to the country level. Within a strategic framework issued every year by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies have full authority to make financial commitments and disburse funds, drawing on different forms of assistance. In places where Norway has no country representation, funds are directed to the United Nations or country-level pooled funds.⁹⁶

To remain efficient while decentralizing, donors can channel their humanitarian and development assistance for non-priority countries through multilateral mechanisms. This includes multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations or the European Commission, as well as pooled funding mechanisms. Pooled funds include global pooled funds such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), as well as humanitarian and development funds established for individual countries. While many aspects of these country-level pooled funds have been criticized, they have also been found effective at strengthening the involvement of national and local NGOs in the response and at supporting country-level coordination.⁹⁷ To date, 16 country-level Emergency Response Funds and 4 Common Humanitarian Funds have been created.⁹⁸

Many donors have recognized the general advantages of decentralization. According to a survey by the Development Co-operation Directorate of the OECD (OECD-DAC), "all DAC members are attempting to decentralise authority

94 Cf. Harvey, 2009, p. 159.

95 OECD, 2010

96 Interview; Spaak, 2009, p. 6

97 Cf. e.g. Steets et al., 2010; Mowjee, January 2007, Willitts-King, 2007.

98 OCHA Funding Coordination Section, December 2010

over development cooperation to the field and commitment to decentralisation has been rising since the Paris Declaration was adopted.”⁹⁹ While the effects of decentralization on the linkages between relief, recovery and development have not yet been explicitly assessed, it is widely acknowledged that decentralization makes donors more adaptive to local needs and enhances donor coordination.¹⁰⁰ This implies that decentralization also makes it easier to address recovery needs and this helps to reduce the recovery funding gap. Since links between relief, recovery and development are also a matter of coordination, it also implies that decentralization helps to address at least some of the linkage challenges. Interviews conducted for this study confirmed that for example DFID field staff can flexibly draw on humanitarian as well as development instruments and thereby ensure that priority needs are met and that funding continuity can be granted where it is deemed necessary.

4.3.2 Institutional integration

As mentioned above, institutional divisions are a major factor hindering stronger links between different forms of assistance. This applies particularly when two different ministries or equivalent institutions are responsible for humanitarian assistance and development cooperation respectively, as is the case for example in the European Commission and Germany.

Institutional integration can therefore help to strengthen the links between different forms of assistance. It can change political interests and dynamics and thereby facilitate collaboration and cooperation between different government units. The vast majority of donor governments today have one primary aid ministry or institution responsible for both, humanitarian and development assistance.

Yet, institutional integration is no silver bullet. To ensure the independence of humanitarian assistance, humanitarian departments within development ministries often enjoy relative autonomy. As our interviews with a broad range of donors demonstrate, formally integrated donors thus often face similar, though often less intense, linkage challenges as those maintaining two separate institutions.

4.3.3 Whole-of-government approaches

Whole-of-government approaches encourage coordination and cooperation between different parts of the government. They point in the same direction as institutional integration, but differ in key respects. They maintain the formal independence of the different institutions involved, making them easier to implement, but also

99 OECD, 2009, p. 3

100 An OECD-DAC summary of lessons learned from peer reviews, for example, emphasizes that “a decentralised approach permits the donor to be more adaptive and responsive to locally expressed needs” OECD, 2008, p. 14. The same report finds that a decentralized approach also helps to “co-ordinate more readily with other partners”, which implies that it facilitates the coordination between humanitarian and development programs as well. OECD, 2008, p. 14

leaving some of the main institutional dynamics in place. At the same time, whole-of-government approaches can involve more actors that are relevant to the solution of a particular problem. For emergency contexts, for example, they can include not only the humanitarian and development arms of the government, but also security-related, diplomatic and environmental agencies.

Whole-of-government approaches can be introduced at various levels of formality. The more they create actual interdependence between institutions, the more systematic and effective tend to be their benefits.

The most far-reaching whole-of-government model creates inter-ministerial pooled funds and requires joint decision-making to determine their use. The **UK**, for example, established a **Conflict Pool** in 2001 to facilitate better links between its diplomatic, defense and development efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states. The pool integrates conflict prevention, stabilization and peace-keeping budgets, some of which are ODA eligible and some are not.¹⁰¹ The Conflict Pool is jointly administered by DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Defence and provides additional funding to allocations of the three ministries. For 2011/2012, the Conflict Pool has a budget of around € 741 million, about half of which is earmarked for international peace-keeping operations. From the remaining discretionary funds, the Conflict Pool among others provides € 14 million per year in core funding for the UK's Stabilization Unit (see below).

The **Dutch Stability Fund** and the **Danish Stabilisation Fund**, both introduced in section 3.3.2 above, work according to similar principles.

Another model has been chosen by **Switzerland**. Rather than using pooled funds as part of a whole-of-government strategy, it is pioneering integrated budget planning for its humanitarian and development envelopes. For 2012, the humanitarian and development departments of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation have for the first time developed a consolidated budget proposal document including both budget lines.

One level below this is the creation of formal inter-ministerial committees. They ensure that other relevant ministries are consulted during the decision-making process and often require their formal consent. For dealing with countries in emergencies, governments have taken different stances on whether or not military actors are included in inter-ministerial committees. Thus, the **UK's Stabilisation Unit** is staffed by and reports to DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Defence. The unit promotes joint planning and coordination for stabilization in specific countries. A dozen planners within the unit support this process through activities ranging from inter-departmental facilitation of decision-making to giving substantial input, depending on the demand.

101 Government of the United Kingdom, 2010, OECD-DAC, 2006, p. 27, Interview.

The **Netherlands** have a formal bi-weekly inter-ministerial coordination mechanism for joint policy-making for fragile contexts, the Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Reconstruction. It has recently been expanded to include all ministerial stakeholders, including the ministries of economic affairs, foreign affairs (including development cooperation), interior, agriculture, finance, justice, and defense.¹⁰²

Less far-reaching alternatives include regular **inter-ministerial coordination meetings**, such as for example the yearly meetings between the humanitarian task force of the German foreign office and the development ministry's DETA unit that have been held over the last four years. Representatives discuss geographic and programmatic priorities and give mutual recommendations on submitted project sketches before each ministry makes its final annual grant allocations. Norway forms open working groups for bigger engagements such as Sudan and Afghanistan that meet regularly to assess the situation and agree on the way forward. These coordination groups are formed ad hoc depending on the issue at stake. They normally include staff from relevant departments at headquarters, the concerned embassies via video conference as well as outside stakeholders, such as implementing partners.

Beyond these formal mechanisms, much internal coordination and cooperation happens informally. Thus, for example, officials often report that they meet their counterparts in other institutions whenever the need arises and that they interact closely with each other. Informal cooperation can be very effective, but it strongly depends on personal sympathies and can easily be disrupted when institutional politics gets in the way.

4.3.4 Strengthening linkage capacities of implementing partners

Donors can also adopt various measures to encourage and support their implementing partners in linking relief, recovery and development. First, donors can strategically work through local and national organizations in emergency-affected countries where such capacities exist. Local organizations are usually best placed to facilitate the transition to development. They are themselves part of the capacity that is needed for longer-term development, they often do not draw artificial distinctions between different types of assistance and are often better aware of regular structures and their requirements for functioning. Some donors, especially those with a strong presence on the ground like the **United Kingdom**, work directly with local organizations. Others, like **Germany**, work through multilateral organizations or domestic NGOs who in turn work with local partners.

Second, donors can strategically try to identify partner organizations that are able to operate across different forms of assistance. This would allow different aid

102 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Nov 2008

departments to rely more often on the same partners. Since there is only a limited number of organizations that can work in both relief and development, this implies, however, that donors should not overly restrict their pool of potential partners. Thus, donors who work exclusively through NGOs based in their countries often limit their ability to select those partners who have the best policies and practices in place for linking relief, recovery and development.

Third, donors can provide their partners with incentives and make it easier for them to work across the different forms of assistance. While **German** aid institutions continue to work with very different pools of implementing partners, for example, they seek to provide them with incentives to strengthen linkages. Funding applications for humanitarian assistance, for example, require applicants to identify potential follow-up projects so that the Foreign Office can inform BMZ on upcoming funding needs.¹⁰³ Similar requirements to identify links can be included in all proposal forms, as well as in reporting requirements. Implementing partners also often demand that application and reporting procedures be harmonized – not only between different donors, but also between different assistance forms of the same donor.

Fourth, even in situations where it makes sense for implementing partners to focus only on humanitarian activities and not to offer development services at the same time, donors can support agencies with an early recovery approach. They can either include this in their allocation criteria or they can help organizations gain the necessary skills and outlook, for example by offering specific training.¹⁰⁴

4.3.5 Other pragmatic steps

Within administrations, the success or failure of linkage strategies largely depends on the mindset and willingness of staff members. The institutional and procedural reforms outlined above change operating environments in order to achieve positive changes. These reforms can be complemented by a range of other pragmatic steps – none of which are sufficient on their own for strengthening linkages – to provide staff members with the capacities, incentives and opportunities to strengthen links between relief, recovery and development. They include among others:

- A clear expression of political will to strengthen linkages through the political leadership of the relevant ministries and departments
- Conscious hiring of staff members with mixed backgrounds in humanitarian and development contexts

103 AA, 2009

104 Such as for example a specialized training on managing the transition to and from development offered by the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency in cooperation with Harvard University <http://www.atha.se/training-seminars/atha-specialized-training-managing-humanitarian-assistance-and-transition-tofrom-d> (last accessed February 2011).

- Targeted training on early recovery and recovery for humanitarian staff, as well as disaster risk reduction and conflict prevention for development staff
- Inclusion of the different aspects of linking in job descriptions and feedback/evaluation formats
- Joint inter-departmental activities, including for example joint trainings, field visits or evaluations

4.4 Conditions for linking relief, recovery and development

Donors, then, can use a broad spectrum of measures to strengthen links between relief, recovery and development. Yet, there is still a debate about when and where it is both possible and desirable to strengthen these links.¹⁰⁵ Some humanitarians are concerned that too close cooperation with development or even military actors might undermine their reputation as independent, neutral and impartial actors. They fear access problems and security threats for their staff members as a consequence.

A number of examples show that these fears are not unfounded: Humanitarian NGOs were expelled from Sudan in 2009. They are largely barred from entering conflict areas such as Sa'ada in Northern Yemen. The government of Myanmar was even reluctant to grant humanitarian organizations access to victims of a natural disaster. Moreover, statistics show that attacks against humanitarian workers have more than doubled over the last decade. They increased from an average of 4 victims per 10.000 aid workers in the field in 1997 to 9 per 10.000 in 2008.¹⁰⁶

It is against this background that the question arises, should aid actors always try to link different forms of assistance and if not, under what conditions should such linkages be created?

The unanimous answer of all those consulted for this study is that attempts to link should always be made. Circumstances do, however, determine which forms of linking are appropriate in which situation – natural disaster or conflict, strong or weak government, willing or unwilling government. Most donor strategies for strengthening links can be applied without fear of negative repercussions in most situations and there is no situation that does not allow for at least some linking strategies.

Linking strategies can be problematic when they very demonstratively introduce an integrated approach and when governments, authority holders or rebel groups

105 Cf. e.g. Jayasuriya, 2010.

106 Harvey, 2010, p. 26.

are weary of outside interference. Take for example the case of a natural disaster occurring on the territory of a disputed government such as Myanmar. Following Cyclone Nargis, the government feared external intervention. Donors trying to establish integrated humanitarian and development offices on the ground, pursuing strong whole-of-government approaches including their military forces or conducting joint field visits might aggravate the government's mistrust and hinder humanitarian access. In these situations, as well as conflict situations involving the government, donors should also not insist on working with partner organizations that are also active in development if this puts humanitarian access at risk. Yet in all of these cases it is possible to work through decentralized humanitarian and development offices that are not integrated, to channel funds through local pooled funds and to support implementing partners adopting early recovery strategies, to name just a few.

4.5 German linkage policies and practices

Over recent years, Germany has been repeatedly criticized for not creating sufficient links between its relief, recovery and development activities despite increased efforts to improve its practices.¹⁰⁷ This section summarizes the main criticisms leveled against the German administration and highlights emerging good practice.

4.5.1 Main criticisms

Institutional fragmentation

In Germany, responsibilities for humanitarian assistance and development assistance are split between two ministries, the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Disputes over mandates have made cooperation between the two ministries generally difficult, though the government has emphasized the need for stronger links and good contacts sometimes exist at the operational level. Moreover, within the development ministry, “development-oriented emergency and transitional aid” (DETA) is administered by a separate and relatively independent unit. Germany thus faces linkage challenges between relief and recovery or transitional aid, as well as between recovery or transition and development.

Institutional fragmentation of German aid is still acute in many partner countries. To date, BMZ only has a weak presence in most partner countries. Instead, Germany's main implementing agencies, namely the German International Cooperation (GIZ)¹⁰⁸ and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) usually each have their

107 Cf. e.g. OECD, 2010, VENRO, 2006. Primary source of information for this chapter are numerous interviews with both DETA- recipient and non-recipient NGOs, as well as with DETA and foreign office staff. For a full listing of interviewees, please see Appendix A.


108 GIZ, the Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit, was created in early 2011 through a merger of the former Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Inwent and Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED).

own country offices, now increasingly located within “German houses” – common office buildings. Moreover, there are often institutional divisions within these institutions, for example between different GIZ programs.¹⁰⁹

Differences in approaches and procedures

This institutional fragmentation can present significant obstacles for implementing partners intent on integrating relief, recovery and development aspects into their work. This is in part because the different departments work with very different pools of implementing partners as illustrated below. Thus, the Foreign Office funds about 50 NGOs, whereas DETA to date has only been supporting ten German NGOs¹¹⁰ next to Germany’s main implementing organization GIZ¹¹¹ and some multilateral organizations.¹¹² Organizations that do not benefit from the fund criticize that there are no explicit criteria for defining which organizations are eligible for DETA and that DETA’s partner pool is small. Moreover, the largest DETA contribution currently goes to GIZ, which to date has not been tasked with emergency programs by the Foreign Office. Other departments within BMZ work with around 200 different implementing partners. The fact that there are few overlaps between the partner organizations of the Foreign Office, DETA and BMZ means that only very few organizations have the opportunity of implementing relief as well as transition and development projects.

Pools of eligible partners differ



¹⁰⁹ This was for example the case in Sierra Leone, where the study team conducted a country visit in order to document good practice in linking between DETA-funds and regular development cooperation.

¹¹⁰ Other German NGOs complain that the basis on which these ten organizations are selected is intransparent and demand clearer eligibility criteria. German NGOs that have received DETA funding in 2011 include Deutscher Caritasverband, e.V., Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V., Help - Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V., Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe e.V., CARE Deutschland-Luxemburg e.V., Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Malteser Hilfsdienst e.V., Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., Kindernothilfe e.V. and Johanniter International e.V.

¹¹¹ The GIZ (former GTZ) received € 150.27 million in DETA funds in the period 2006–09. This amount exceeds the total allocation to DETA’s NGO implementation partners by 35 %. Data Source: Bundestag, 2010.

¹¹² The World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA), Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and the World Bank’s Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Those few organizations that manage to cover different aspects or phases of their work through different budget lines have to fulfil the different reporting and accountability demands for each of those lines.¹¹³

Problems regarding the division of labor

In addition, the division of labor between the ministries and departments is problematic in several respects. First, the responsibilities of the Foreign Office and BMZ overlap in important areas. This includes for example disaster risk reduction activities. As argued above, disaster risk reduction by its nature is mainly a development task, but has turned de facto into a cross-cutting issue. Following this general trend, disaster risk reduction activities are supported not only by the Foreign Office and DETA, but also by the Ministry for Environment and the Ministry for Education and Research.¹¹⁴ Yet, none of the ministries holds a clear lead and partner organizations report that they are frequently referred back from one ministry to another. Table 3 provides an overview of the disaster risk reduction portfolios of the Foreign Office and BMZ's DETA.

Responsibilities also overlap in the area of food assistance, where DETA is responsible for regular emergency food aid, whereas the Foreign Office supports targeted nutritional interventions such as fortified foods, nutritional supplements and food deliveries that are part of other projects, for example health interventions.

These overlaps lead to competition over resources and mandates between the two ministries and to confusion among partner organizations.

113 Finding from interviews, see also VENRO, 2006.

114 The BMU supports DRR through its International Climate Initiative, which funds disaster prevention activities as part of its climate change adaptation program strand. The BMBF supports research on disaster risk reduction and runs various DRR projects such as for the development of a Tsunami Early-Warning System for the Indian Ocean, and a weather observation system for West Africa.

Table 3: Disaster risk reduction in the Foreign Office and DETA

	Foreign Office	BMZ/DETA
Target situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hydrological disasters Seismological disasters Climatic disasters, except drought 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hydrological disasters Seismologic disasters Climatic disasters, including drought
Beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All possible from local community to government Deliberate focus on local communities in project work Support to international fora (ISDR) 	All possible from local community to government and international level
Project types	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk analysis and vulnerability assessment Disaster prevention Disaster preparedness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk analysis and vulnerability assessment Disaster prevention Disaster preparedness
Maximum project duration	18 months	36 months
Repeat financing?	No, referral to DETA after first round of financing	Possible
Earmarking	10 percent of humanitarian assistance	None

Second, criticism of overlapping responsibilities has led to a more rigid division of labor in some partner countries. In Afghanistan, for example, the Foreign Office, BMZ-DETA and other BMZ units have decided each to focus on different regions and different sectors to avoid allegations of overlap. Since the different actors do not work in the same regions and sectors in Afghanistan, it is impossible to create linkages between the different forms of assistance.¹¹⁵ Similar problems have been reported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan.¹¹⁶

115 During the field visit to Afghanistan conducted for this study, the sectoral and geographic division of labor between the main German aid activities was frequently cited as a major impediment to effective linking.

116 GTZ, August 2009, Interviews

Insufficient formal coordination

Finally, the German government currently lacks sufficient formal coordination mechanisms. While first steps have been taken to improve practice in this respect (see below), problems remain regarding coordination between the Foreign Office and DETA, between DETA and other BMZ units as well as between the Foreign Office, BMZ and other ministries and units that can be relevant for recovery and stabilization. Thus, information is exchanged incompletely or too late, the planning processes are hardly interlinked and formal coordination meetings are rare.

4.5.2 Emerging good practice

Especially since the inauguration of the conservative-liberal coalition government under chancellor Merkel, the German administration has expressed its clear political will to adopt a more coherent foreign and aid policy. Thus, Germany's new ministers for foreign affairs and development, both members of the liberal party, have repeatedly expressed their intention to enhance coordination and cooperation between their houses. While these declarations have not transformed political practice overnight, implementing partners testify that they have noted increased efforts and somewhat improved practices. First signs of progress are apparent among others with regards to inter- and inner-ministerial coordination, country-level coordination and an increasing number of examples of ongoing project support across different forms of assistance.

Inter- and inner-ministerial coordination

The Foreign Office and BMZ have taken several formal steps to strengthen coordination and cooperation. Thus, for example, partner organizations now have to identify opportunities for follow-up funding when they apply for humanitarian funding with the Foreign Office.¹¹⁷ Relevant project applications are then forwarded to DETA to facilitate planning. In addition, an annual coordination meeting between the humanitarian task force of the Foreign Office and DETA takes place. During this meeting, representatives discuss geographic and programmatic priorities and provide each other with recommendations on funding proposals. BMZ also participates in the multi-stakeholder coordination committee for humanitarian assistance led by the Foreign Ministry and a German NGO umbrella organization. Further, the ministries have piloted country-focused coordination meetings. Finally, the planning process for DETA funds offers room for coordination: When preparing their submissions, country officers within the DETA unit can, and to varying degrees do, consult with their counterparts both within BMZ and the Foreign Office.

Country-level coordination

Another important step includes measures to enhance coordination among the different German aid agencies and their partner organizations on the ground. To strengthen BMZ's capacity to oversee and coordinate aid actors on the ground, a total of 50 of so-called economic cooperation officers or development advisers have been deployed to 47 partner countries. These officials are BMZ staff members hosted by the local German embassy that act as liaison officers on development questions to the host government and other German institutions in the country. Economic cooperation officers, however, do not have any decision-making authority. In practice, most German implementing partners in-country, including GIZ, therefore do not report to those country-based officials, but via their own headquarters to BMZ in Germany.

Enhanced flexibility

The German government has also started to increase the flexibility of some of its funding instruments. Thus, for example, the Foreign Office is usually only able to support humanitarian projects for up to six months. This period has been extended to 18 months for projects in the area of disaster risk reduction. Similarly, BMZ has reacted to criticisms regarding the rigid use of the principle of annuality for cash expenditures by extending the relevant timeframe for DETA-supported projects by an additional two months. Aside from its pre-defined time-frame, the allocation of DETA funds is relatively flexible and covers relief as well as recovery and development activities.

Examples of project support across assistance forms

Finally, while there is no exact overview of such cases, an increasing number of projects supported through several forms of assistance have recently come to the fore. Sierra Leone, for example, a project for the resettlement and reintegration of youths was implemented as part of a DETA program. Following the successful piloting of this initiative, it was scaled up and transferred into a regular, German-financed development program for employment promotion.¹¹⁸ Similar examples of German projects have been reported among others from Afghanistan, Senegal, Tajikistan, Niger, Cambodia and Timor-Leste.

A closer examination of the Sierra Leonean example for this study also revealed several important conditions enabling the relatively smooth transition between assistance forms, among others:

- The development orientation of the original DETA-funded transition project;

118 For a detailed guide to the project and its implementation, please see Baxter, 2009

- The strong development background of staff members implementing DETA projects;
- The presence of an aid coordinator backed by BMZ and supporting the coordination and integration of various programs;
- The ability of the pilot project to demonstrate good results and the active efforts of the country team to disseminate information about these results; and
- Good working relations between key staff members.

5 Conclusion

Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation pursue different aims and follow different principles. Donors therefore typically have different processes and institutions for administering the two. This split has negative side effects. On the one hand, there are gaps in funding for the transition between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. On the other hand, there is a disconnect between the two forms of assistance that results in an excessive short-term orientation of humanitarian assistance, a discontinuity of project implementation across the two forms of assistance and an insufficient focus on disaster risk reduction and preparedness among development actors.

Recognizing these challenges, donors have taken a range of different steps for strengthening links between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. These steps do not add up to one coherent reform program. Rather, they focus on different aspects of the problem and each entail their own trade-offs.

A first option is to address one of the main effects of the split – the funding gap – by providing targeted support to the transition between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation through a dedicated fund or budget line. Such budget lines or funds are comparatively easy to create and provide very visible and welcome support to an important gap area. Yet, the strategy also has important downsides as there is a trade-off between providing focused support to a specific area and providing more holistic and flexible support. A special funding line may be effective in plugging an existing gap, but it exacerbates the challenge of linking different forms of aid as it adds to the fragmentation of the aid architecture.

A second option is decentralization. Decentralization is a general concept for aid reform, rather than a targeted measure to strengthen links between different forms of assistance. The reform, however, also entails expected benefits with regards to both closing the transition gap and addressing the disconnect between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. By making allocation decisions at the country level, donors can tailor their support better to the situation on the ground and meet priority needs, including recovery and transition needs. Especially if the same individual or office in-country is responsible for administering both humanitarian and development assistance, they can create pragmatic linkages between the different funding lines and different implementing partners. While decentralization can be implemented gradually, however, it entails a fundamental institutional reform, requires significant donor capacities on the ground and therefore usually requires focusing on a limited number of priority countries and relying on multilateral support mechanisms for the remainder.

A third option is to introduce stronger intra-governmental coordination. Strengthening internal coordination between humanitarian, development and potentially other units, departments or institutions is unavoidable for strengthening

links and thereby also closing the transition funding gap. Reform steps to enhance coordination can be incremental and range all the way from small, pragmatic steps to improve information exchange and joint planning to formal inter-ministerial committees, whole-of-government approaches or institutional integration.

Finally, any of these strategies can and should be complemented by measures to enable and incentivize implementing partners to adopt more holistic approaches and strengthen the links between different forms of assistance. This can include for example relying on the same partner organizations for humanitarian and development projects, requesting them to outline their linking strategies in funding applications and supporting them in identifying opportunities for follow-up funding. Donors should, however, be cautious in applying these measures in situations where a strict adherence to the humanitarian principles is necessary for ensuring access and security for humanitarian workers.

Annex A: List of interviewees

International Institutions

- Katja Albrecht, European Commission, EuropeAid Development and Cooperation DG, Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, Unit I.
- Pierre Bessuges, Inter-Agency Field Advisor, Early Recovery Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP
- Roisin de Burca, Senior Operations Officer (Peace and Stability Trust Fund), Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, Operations Policy and Country Services, the World Bank
- Kimberly Deni, Humanitarian Policy and Transition Service, Policy, Planning and Strategy Division, World Food Programme (WFP)
- Barbara Goedde, Programme Analyst, Early Recovery & Cross-Cutting Issues Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP
- Christian Lotz, Peacebuilding Specialist, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP
- Ascension Martinez, shelter delegate, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- Jahal Rabesahala de Meritens, Coordinator, Global Cluster on Early Recovery, Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery, UNDP
- David Murphy, Early Recovery Advisor, Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER)
- Bertrand Salvignol, Food Technologist, Head Food Safety and Quality Assurance Unit, World Food Programme (WFP)
- Giovanni Taylor-Peace, Manager, Disaster Response Field Operations, Habitat for Humanity International
- Jeff Tschirley, Chief, Rehabilitation and Humanitarian Policies Unit (TCER), Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division, Technical Cooperation Department, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- Asbjorn Wee, Coordinator, Financial Aid Architecture Task Force, International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), OECD DAC

- Doekle Wielinga, Team Leader, Sustainable Recovery, World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction (WB- GFDRR)

Other OECD-DAC member governments

- Ms. Pauline Torehall and Mr. Thomas Thomsen, Office for Humanitarian Action, Development Policy and Civil Society (HUC), DANIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
- Ronald Wormgoor, Policy Officer, EU External Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands (scheduled for end of January)
- Hanne Meldgaard, Senior Advisor, Section for Development Policy, Norway
- Yves Mauron, Programme Officer / Quality Assurance, DEZA, Switzerland
- Scott Gardiner, Humanitarian Advisor, Humanitarian Disaster Risk and Policy Team, DFID, U.K.
- Rebecca Dale, Conflict Team Leader, DFID, U.K.
- Colum Wilson, Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Africa Department, DFID, U.K.
- Catherine Bishop, Deputy Head of the Stabilisation Unit, DFID, U.K.

DETA recipients

- Heinz Bitsch, Deputy Managing Director, HELP
- Anne Ernst, Desk Officer, Orthopaedics and Rehabilitation, Johanniter
- Roland Hansen, Head of Asia and Haiti Department, Malteser
- Dr. Thorsten Klose, Head of Disaster Prevention, German Red Cross
- Gernot Ritthaler, Coordinator Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Prevention, International Department, Caritas Germany
- Ingo Radtke, Secretary-General, Malteser
- Wolfgang Tyderle, Programme director – Emergencies, CARE Germany
- Annette Wulf, Public Funding Officer, Quality and financial coordination, Focal Group Capacity Building, Welthungerhilfe

Non-recipient NGOs

- Harry Donsbach, Project Coordinator, Relief, World Vision e.V.
- Othman Riad, Project Coordinator, Relief, Medico International e.V.
- Edith Wallmeier, Head of Foreign Aid Department, Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland e.V.

Ministerial and GIZ Staff

- Dr. Volker Erhard, Disaster Reduction, Foreign Office
- Kerstin Faehrmann, Department 401, BMZ
- Dr. Thomas Helfen, Department 401, BMZ
- Ulrich Kaltenbach, Department 401, BMZ
- Michael Kretschmer, Department 401, BMZ
- Nicolas Lamade, GIZ
- Stephan Lockl, Department 401, BMZ
- Daniel Passon, GIZ
- Martina Vatterodt, Department 401, BMZ

Other

- Stuart Clark, Senior Policy Advisor, Canadian Foodgrains Bank
- Jane Gilbert, International Mental Health, Consultant Clinical Psychologist
- Claudia Trentmann, comit GmbH
- Howard Roy Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Humanitarian Cooperation
- Dr. Karl-Otto Zentel, German Committee for Disaster Reduction (DKKV e.V.)

In addition, the study team conducted numerous interviews in the context of two country visits in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.

Bibliography

AA 2008. Konzept zur Förderung von Vorhaben der Humanitären Hilfe aus Kapitel 0502 Titel 687 72. Referat VN05. Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt.

AA 2009. VN05 Formular: Antrag auf eine Zuwendung zur Fehlbedarfsfinanzierung/ Vollfinanzierung. Referat VN05. Berlin: Auswärtiges Amt.

ALNAP 2006. Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria. An ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies. Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) in humanitarian action.

BAILEY, S. 2010. Early recovery in humanitarian appeals. Background document commissioned by the conveners for Montreux X (18-19 March 2010).

BAILEY, S., S. PAVANELLO, S. ELHAWARY & S. O'CALLAGHAN 2009. Early recovery: An overview of policy debates and operational challenges London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI) with Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)

BARNETT, M. 2003. What is the future of humanitarianism? *Global Governance*, 9: 3, 170-91.

BAXTER, J. 2009. "Homeward Bound", the voluntary youth resettlement & reintegration project in Sierra Leone, a step-by-step guide and reference manual GTZ.

BAYNE, S. & P. TROLLIET August 2009. Stocktaking and scoping of the Peacebuilding Partnership For the European Commission - DG RELEX A/2.

BMZ 2005. Konzept für Maßnahmen der entwicklungsorientierten Not- und Übergangshilfe. Referat 213.

BMZ 2007. Richtlinie zur Förderung von Vorhaben der entwicklungsorientierten Not- und Übergangshilfe (ENÜH) aus Kapitel 2302 Titel 687 20.

BMZ 2011. "Was wir machen: Hilfe bei Katastrophen" [Online]. Bonn. Available at: http://www.bmz.de/de/was_wir_machen/themen/umwelt/naturkatastrophen/hilfe_bei_katastrophen/index.html [Accessed 14th of March 2011].

BOYCE, J. & S. FORMAN 2010. Financing peace: international and national resources for post-conflict countries and fragile states

BRUSSET, E., M. BHATT, K. BJORNESTAD, J. COSGRAVE, A. DAVIES, et al. 2009. A ripple in development?: Long term perspectives on the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami 2004. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). Available: http://www.sida.se/PageFiles/16273/SIDA52162en_LRRD-Summary_webb.pdf.

BUNDESTAG 2010. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland 2006-2009, Drucksache 17/2725. Berlin.

CHANDRAN, R., B. JONES & N. SMITH 2008. Recovering from war: gaps in early action. New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation for the UK Department for International Development. Available from: <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/earlyrecoveryfinal.pdf>.

COLLIER, P. 2003. Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. New York: World Bank.

COLLIER, P. & A. HOEFFLER 2004. Aid, policy and growth in Post-Conflict Societies. *European Economic Review*, 48: 5, 1125 -1145.

COLLINSON, S., S. ELHAWARZ & R. MUGGAH 2010. States of fragility: Stabilization and its implications for humanitarian action. *Disasters*, 34 S275-S296.

CWGER 2008a. Financing for early recovery: highlighting the gaps. A review of humanitarian financing mechanisms Financing Task Force of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER).

CWGER 2008b. Guidance note on early recovery Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery in cooperation with the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition.

CWGER 2010. Early recovery coordination lessons learned exercise. Geneva: Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE & USAID 2010. Leading through civilian power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Washington D.C. Available from: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/153142.pdf>.

DFID 2007. Humanitarian funding guidelines for NGOs. London: Department for International Development, Government of the United Kingdom. Available from: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/funding/humanitarian_funding_guidelines_ngo.pdf.

DG ECHO 2011. "Echo Offices: Contact List, Situation on the 15/02/2011" [Online]. Brussels. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/what/field_offices.pdf [Accessed 8th of March 2011].

DONOVAN, C., M. MCGLINCHY, J. STAATZ & D. TSCHIRLEY 2006. Emergency needs assessments and the impact of food aid on local markets. *International Development Working Paper*.

EU 1996. Linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (96)153. Brussels: European Union.

EU 1996, as amended in 2003 & 2009. Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (as amended). Brussels: European Union.

EU 2001. Linking relief, rehabilitation and development – an assessment, communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM (2001)153. Brussels: European Union.

EU 2006, as amended in 2009. Regulation(EC) No. 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for Stability. Brussels: European Union.

EU 2007. “Summaries of EU legislation > development> overseas countries and territories” [Online]. Brussels: European Union. Available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/overseas_countries_territories/r12102_en.htm [Accessed 11th of January 2011].

EU 2008. The European Consensus on humanitarian aid, 2008/C 25/01. Brussels: Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission.

EU 2010a. “The revised Cotonou Agreement: towards a more flexible and effective EU support” [Online]. Brussels: European Union. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/cotonou_programming_en.htm [Accessed 11th of January 2011].

EU 2010b. Second revision of the Cotonou Agreement - consolidated agreed texts. Brussels: European Union. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2001. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2010. Food Security Thematic Programme Strategy Paper (Update) and Multiannual indicative programme 2011 - 2013, Document C/2010/9263 (21 December 2010). Brussels: European Union.

FAO 2010. State of food insecurity in the world 2010. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Available from: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1683e/i1683e.pdf>.

FEW, R. and S. ANAGNOSTI 2010. Supporting disaster risk reduction in developing countries. A study for the European Union, University of East Anglia.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA. N/S. "The Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF)" [Online]. Available at: <http://www.international.gc.ca/START-GTSR/gpsf-fpsm.aspx> [Accessed March 16th 2011].

GHDI 2003. Principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship. Stockholm: Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 2010. The budget for the fiscal year 2011.

GTZ 2007. Allgemeiner Arbeitsrahmen der GTZ zur Umsetzung von Vorhaben der Entwicklungsorientierten Not- und Übergangshilfe: Eine Orientierung für Fachplaner, Portfoliomanager und Auslandsmitarbeiter der GTZ. Eschborn.

GTZ 2009. Lernerfahrungen und strategische Empfehlungen für die Portfoliogestaltung der entwicklungsorientierten Not- und Übergangshilfe in der DR Kongo. Bonn: GTZ.

HARVEY, P. 2009. South Sudan: European Commission approaches to linking relief, rehabilitation and revelopment - a case study. In: Steets, J. & D. Hamilton (eds.) Humanitarian assistance: improving U.S.-European cooperation. Global Public Policy Institute and the Center for Transatlantic Relations.

HARVEY, P., A. STODDARD, A. HARMER & G. TAYLOR 2010. The state of the humanitarian system. Assessing performance and progress. A pilot study. Available from: <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-sohs-final.pdf>.

INCAF 2010a. Draft transition financing guidance (for discussion) INCAF room document 8. 4th Meeting of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) OECD. Conference Center, Paris: International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) of the Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD).

INCAF 2010b. Summary of risk study, INCAF room document 9. 4th Meeting of the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) OECD Conference Center, Paris International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) of the Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD).

INCAF 2010c. Transition financing. Building a better response International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC).

INTERACTION 2010. The transition from emergency relief to development. Washington: InterAction.

JAYASURIYA, S. & P. MCCAWLEY 2010. The Asian Tsunami: Aid and reconstruction after a disaster. Northampton, Massachusetts: Asian Development Bank Institute. .

KANG, S. & J. MEERNIK 2004. Determinants of post-conflict economic assistance. *Journal of Peace Research* 41: 2, 149-166.

KLEM, B. & G. FRERKS 2007. Evaluation of the Stability Fund 2004 and 2005: English summary.

KODDENBROCK, K. 2009. The will to bridge? European Commission and U.S. approaches to linking relief, rehabilitation and development. In: Steets, J. & D. Hamilton (eds.) *Humanitarian assistance: improving U.S.-European cooperation*. Global Public Policy Institute and the Center for Transatlantic Relations.

LAWSON, M. L. 2009. USAID's Office for Transition Initiatives after 15 years Congressional Research Service (CRS).

LEVIN, V. & D. DOLLAR 2005. The forgotten states: aid volumes and volatility in difficult partnership countries (1992-2002). paper prepared for DAC Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD).

LINDAHL, C. 1996. Developmental relief? An issues paper and an annotated bibliography on linking relief and development, 96/3. Stockholm.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK 2008. The Danish Regions of Origin Initiative: Part 1 strategic framework. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Available from: <http://www.um.dk/NR/ronlyres/C3565C92-60CA-4F4D-B087-239876F5920F/0/ROIstrategicFrameworkendelig-partI.pdf>.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK 2010. Peace and Stabilisation: Denmark's policy towards fragile states 2010-2015. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark,. Available from: <http://www.um.dk/NR/ronlyres/331C5FE7-A26C-46A4-8F24-11F8B386D2EA/0/Peaceandstabilisation.pdf>.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE NETHERLANDS 2008. Security and development in fragile states: the Netherlands' strategy 2008-2011 (English version). Peacebuilding and Stabilisation Department. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

MOWJEE, T. & J. RANDEL 2007. Review of OCHA Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available from: <http://ochaonline2.un.org/LinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=35565>.

OCHA FUNDING COORDINATION SECTION 2010. Basic facts about country based humanitarian pooled funds UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available from: <http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Basic%20Facts%20about%20ERFs%20CHFs%20%28OCHA%20banner%29.pdf>.

OECD 2005/2008. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD). Available from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf>.

OECD 2008. Effective aid management: Twelve lessons from the DAC peer reviews. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD). Available from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/0/40720533.pdf>.

OECD 2009. Survey on the levels of decentralisation to the field in DAC members' development cooperation systems, DCD(2009)3/FINAL. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD).

OECD 2010. OECD Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. Annual Report 2010. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD). Available from: http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_45789965_1_1_1_1,00.html.

OECD DAC 2006. Whole of government approaches to fragile states. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD). Available from: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>.

OECD DAC 2010. Germany (2010) DAC Peer Review. Paris: Organisation for economic cooperation and development (OECD).

OECD DAC STATISTICS. 2011. Creditor Reporting System [Online]. Available at: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW> .

SCHWEIZER, B. 2004. Moral dilemmas for humanitarianism in the era of 'humanitarian' military interventions. IRRC, 86 547-564. Available from: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_855_schweizer.pdf.

SMILIE, I. 1998. Relief and development: The struggle for synergy. Studies, T. J. W. J. I. F. I., 33.

SPAACK, M. & R. OTTO 2009. Study on the mapping of donor coordination (humanitarian aid) at the field level. Brussels: Commissioned by DG ECHO on behalf of the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative. Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/evaluation/2009/Donor_coordination.pdf.

STEETS, J., F. GRÜNEWALD, A. BINDER, V. DE GEOFFREY, D. KAUFFMANN, et al. 2010. Cluster approach evaluation 2. Synthesis report. Berlin/Plaisians: Global Public Policy Institute and Groupe U.R.D.

UK CONFLICT POOL SECRETARIAT 2010. Conflict Pool guidance: Guidance & procedures for HMG staff dealing with activities funded by the Conflict Pool. London: Government of the United Kingdom.

UN 1991. Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, GA RES/46/182 Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

UNDG-ECHA 2009. Guidance note on funding for transition.

UNDP 2008. UNDP policy on early recovery United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

UNDP BCPR 2010. Disaster risk reduction and recovery - an introduction Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Available from: <http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/disaster/1Disaster%20Risk%20Reduction%20and%20Recovery%20-%20Introduction.pdf>.

USAID 2009. P.L. 480 Title II program policies and proposal guidelines. Bureau for Democracy Conflict & Humanitarian Assistance & Office of Food for Peace. Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

VENRO 2006. Linking relief, rehabilitation and development: Approaches and financing instruments to improve the transition between relief, rehabilitation and development co-operation Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Regierungsorganisationen e.V. (VENRO).

VOICE 2006. The issue - linking relief to rehabilitation and development: LRRD. Brussels.

WELTHUNGERHILFE 2007. Orientation framework: Rehabilitation in overseas cooperation (2nd ed.).

WELTHUNGERHILFE N/S. Orientierungsrahmen Nothilfe. Nothilfe für Opfer von Naturkatastrophen und gewaltsamen Konflikten. Available from: <http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/fachkonzepte-der-welthungerhilfe.html>.

WFP 2009. WFP financial framework: presentation on programme categories World Food Programme (WFP).

WILLITTS-KING, B., T. MOWJEE, et al. 2007. Evaluation of common/pooled humanitarian funds in DRC and Sudan, UN OCHA.

WORLD BANK 2011. World Development Report 2011, Background Paper World Bank.

WORLD BANK 2009. State- and peace-building fund. Progress report. The World Bank. Available from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOPCS/Resources/380831-1179760814022/3798730-1243529198321/SPF_Progress_Report_May_2009.pdf.

WORLD BANK 2011. State- and Peace-building Fund. Annual report fiscal year 2010 The World Bank. Available from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1240930480694/SPF_Annual_Report_FY10.pdf.

WORLD BANK N/S. The State- and Peacebuilding Fund. Addressing the unique challenges of fragility and conflict (Brochure) The World Bank. Available from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1240930480694/OPCFC_fragility-brochure-final-150.pdf.